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IS TOBACCO A DRUG? ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES AS COMMON LAW COURTS
CASS R. SUNSTEIN†
Professor Cass Sunstein argues that the FDA has the authority to
regulate tobacco products. He considers the text of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which supports the FDA assertion, and the
context of its enactment, which argues against the FDA. He resolves
the tension between text and context in favor of FDA jurisdiction by
turning to the emerging role of administrative agencies. In modern
government, he contends, administrative agencies have become
America’s common law courts, with the power to adapt statutory regimes to new facts and new values when the underlying statute is ambiguous.
Professor Sunstein’s Article, like the other pieces in this volume,
was written after the United States District Court for the Middle Dis1
trict of North Carolina decided Coyne Beahm v. FDA, but before a
three judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed that decision in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
2
v. FDA. In Coyne Beahm, the District Court held that the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act authorized the FDA to regulate tobacco products, but not tobacco advertising. The Fourth Circuit rejected the District Court’s jurisdictional ruling and invalidated the
FDA’s regulations in their entirety. The Clinton Administration has
3
since requested an en banc rehearing before the Fourth Circuit.

† Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I am
grateful to Elizabeth Garrett, Jack Goldsmith, Dan Kahan, Martha Nussbaum, Eric Posner,
Richard Posner, David Strauss, and Peter Strauss for valuable comments. In his Article, Professor Sunstein presents the arguments he first offered on March 6, 1998, at the Duke Law Journal’s 1998 Administrative Law Conference.
1. Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
2. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, Nos. 97-1604, 97-1581, 97-1606, 97-1614,
97-1605, 1998 WL 473320, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 1998).
3. See Appellees’ Petition for Rehearing, Brown & Williamson (No. 97-1604).
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INTRODUCTION
A. The Problem
Does the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have the
authority to regulate tobacco and tobacco products? For a long time
the FDA said that it did not. In 1996, the FDA changed its mind.4
The principal issue raised by this assertion of authority is whether tobacco qualifies as a “drug.”
The issue is exceptionally important for both policy and law. It is
important for policy because FDA authority over tobacco products is
significant in itself, and also because a resolution of the case will provide the backdrop for statutory developments and for any continuing
settlement negotiations between the tobacco industry and government.5 Obviously new initiatives will be much affected by the existing
power of the FDA. The question is important for law because it
raises large issues not only about the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA)6 but also about the nature of statutory interpretation in the
administrative state. Above all, these questions involve the respective
roles of courts and administrative agencies in settling the meaning of
federal law.
The statutory definition of “drug” reads as follows:
The term ‘drug’ means (A) articles recognized in the official United
States Pharmacopoeia, official Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the
United States, or official National Formulary, or any supplement to
any of them; and (B) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals; and (C) articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals; and (D)
4. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,396 (1996) (codified at 21
C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, 897 (1997)) [hereinafter FDA Regulations] (announcing
regulation of the sale and promotion of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco to individuals under
the age of eighteen).
5. These issues have received a great deal of attention in 1997 and 1998. See, e.g., Excerpts From Agreement Between States and Tobacco Industry, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1997, at B8
[hereinafter Tobacco Settlement Excerpts]; see also Barry Meier, Talks Stall in Effort to Reach
Tobacco Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1998, at A14 (reporting that recent settlement negotiations have been abandoned).
6. Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397
(1994 & Supp. II 1997)). The FDCA replaced the Pure Food and Drug Act of June 30, 1906,
Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1934)). See FDCA,
§ 902(a), 52 Stat. at 1059 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1994)).
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articles intended for use as a component of any article specified in
7
clause (A), (B), or (C) of this paragraph.

For purposes of the FDA’s assertion of jurisdiction over tobacco, the
key provision is clause (C), defining a drug as an “article[ ] . . . intended to affect the structure or any function of the body.” Is tobacco
such an article? I will be urging here that the FDA has the legal
authority to answer this question either no or yes, and that its yes in
1996 is therefore lawful. 8
B. Several Puzzles, and a Particular Dispute
The dispute over the authority of the FDA9 to regulate tobacco
raises a number of questions—indeed, a remarkably high percentage
7. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (1994). This subsection goes on to explain that a “food or dietary
supplement . . . is not a drug solely because the label or the labeling contains such a claim.” Id.
8. Ultimately, the FDA concluded that tobacco products are “combination products”
involving drugs and devices. See FDA Regulations, supra note 4, at 44,403. I deal principally
here with the issue of whether tobacco products qualify as “drugs.” An affirmative answer is
the basic predicate for FDA authority under the FDA’s conclusion that cigarettes are “devices”
because “the primary purpose of parts of the cigarette . . . is to effectuate the delivery of a carefully controlled amount of the nicotine to a site in the human body where it can be absorbed.”
Analysis Regarding the Food and Drug Administration’s Jurisdiction Over NicotineContaining Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,453, 41,522 (Aug. 11,
1995) [hereinafter FDA Jurisdictional Analysis]. The statutory definition of “device” includes:
[A]n instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including any component, part, or accessory,
which is –
...
(3) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals, and
which does not achieve its primary intended purposes through chemical action within
or on the body or man or other animals and which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of its primary intended purposes.
21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (1994). I do not discuss this provision, except to suggest that if the FDA is
authorized to define tobacco products as a drug, it is almost certainly authorized to treat such
products as “combination products” subject to its device authority. See FDA Regulations, supra
note 1, at 44,402 (explaining FDA jurisdiction over combination products).
9. In its remarkably broad opinion, completed as this Article went to press, the court of
appeals invalidated the FDA regulation on various grounds. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. v. FDA, Nos. 97-1604, 97-1581, 97-1606, 97-1614, 97-1605, 1998 WL 473320, at *1 (4th
Cir. Aug. 14, 1998). The points made by the court are discussed at separate places below; I
identify the elements of the court’s analysis here, and also the places where these are addressed, and I make a few supplemental points.
The most striking feature of the court’s approach is its failure to deal with the language
of the key provision of the statute, an especially striking omission in light of the court’s admission that the “literal” language of the statute strongly supports the FDA. See Brown & Williamson, 1998 WL 473320, at *4. An especially disturbing feature of the court’s opinion is the
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of the set of questions raised in a whole semester of administrative
law. Examples of these questions include the following: the power of
an administrative agency to change its mind; the role of unenacted
legislation; the extent to which subsequent legislative action can divest an agency of authority that it might otherwise have; the authority
of an agency to define its own jurisdiction; and the law-interpreting
power of agencies. The dispute over the FDA’s authority could ultimately be resolved on these or any number of other grounds, and I
will take up these and other questions in the course of the discussion.

sheer number of arguments invoked on behalf of its conclusion; the court gives no sense of
which of those arguments are necessary, or sufficient, for the outcome. In any case the following are the principal points.
First, the court suggested that the FDA’s view was entitled to less than the usual level
of deference because it involved a determination of its own jurisdiction. See Brown & Williamson, 1998 WL 473320, at *3. Even if this suggestion is correct, the FDA should probably prevail
under the narrow rationale urged below, in Part V.C.1.
Second, the court found “intrinsic evidence” against the assertion of authority by virtue of the fact that the FDA did not ban tobacco products after finding they qualified as combination products. See Brown & Williamson, 1998 WL 473320, at *4-9. This was a structural argument. The court suggested that drugs and devices must be proved safe and effective before
they can be sold, see 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(2) (1998); the fact that tobacco products are dangerous and unsafe, but were not banned, shows that the agency had acted unlawfully. The court
invoked various provisions requiring certain restrictions on drugs and devices, such as a ban on
misbranded drugs and devices, see 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (1998), and a requirement that drugs contain adequate directions for use, see 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(1) (1998); see also 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(2)
(1998) (requiring adequate warnings against use by children); 21 U.S.C. § 360c(b)(1) (1998)
(requiring classifications of devices intended for human use); 21 U.S.C. § 360h(e)(1) (1998)
(requiring “cease distribution” orders for products found to cause serious adverse health consequences). In the court’s view, the FDA’s failure to impose various disabilities on tobacco,
including a ban, suggested that the FDA had violated the statute.
This is, however, an extremely puzzling argument. If the FDA concluded that some
substance X is a drug, but did not ban X, it would not follow that the FDA lacked authority
over X. It might follow that the FDA had acted unlawfully in failing to ban X; with respect to
tobacco, it might also follow, from the court’s arguments, that the FDA was required to engage
in various other regulatory restrictions. But the FDA offered reasonable arguments for refusing
to ban tobacco products, see infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text, or to require instructions
on how to use cigarettes, see FDA Regulations, supra note 4, at 44,520-21, and in any case any
inadequacy in these arguments would not justify a conclusion that the FDA lacked legal
authority over tobacco products. It would merely justify a conclusion that the FDA was required to go further than it did.
Third, the court found “extrinsic evidence” against the regulation in the failure to
mention tobacco in the text or history of the Act; in the FDA’s historical practice; in congressional inaction; and in Congress’s tobacco-specific legislation. See Brown & Williamson, 1998
WL 473320, at *9-19. Each of these arguments is addressed below. See infra notes 53-61 and
accompanying text (discussing the FDA’s historical practice); infra notes 179-187 (discussing
congressional inaction or the lack thereof); infra notes 188-190 (discussing Congress’s tobaccospecific legislation).
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My principal emphasis, however, will be on a conflict between
two different styles of statutory interpretation.10 The first is a form of
literalism: it stresses the need to interpret statutory terms in accordance with their ordinary, plain meaning to speakers of English.11 Because of the breadth of the language of the FDCA, this approach
strongly supports the FDA. The second style of interpretation is
more contextual: it emphasizes the need to understand statutory
terms taken in their original context, in accordance with thencontemporary understandings of their meaning. This argument creates serious problems for the FDA because the context of the statute
suggests a narrower reading than the text alone. These two styles
produce conflicts in many different areas of statutory law. To take
just two examples, the dispute between them accounts for internal
disputes on the Supreme Court about the legality of affirmative action under a law forbidding “discrimination”12 and also about whether
someone “uses” a gun when he sells it for cash.13
There is no simple or easy choice between the two approaches.
The literalist approach has many advantages. It enables diverse
judges to coordinate about both method and outcomes, prevents
guessing games about the nature of past contexts, and may well impose good incentives on the enacting legislature.14 Its disadvantage is
10. The statement in this paragraph is an oversimplification; a more precise explanation of
the two styles may be found below, in Part IV.C.
11. Of course, this idea produces many puzzles of its own. In the context here, it is intelligible because the definition of “drug” does have such an ordinary meaning that, as we will see,
becomes unsettled only by an investigation of context. For a discussion of the possibility of literal interpretation, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 215-18 (1991)
(arguing that interpretation is difficult only in the rare case). A recent case strongly affirming
the “plain meaning” approach to statutory interpretation is Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct.
805, 808 (1998) (stating that the Court should not infer unwritten limitations in an act when its
language has a clear meaning). For a more detailed discussion of Brogan, see infra notes 161168 and accompanying text.
12. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (holding that Title VII’s
ban on racial discrimination does not encompass all private sector affirmative action programs). For a more detailed discussion of Weber, see infra notes 151-153 and accompanying
text.
13. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 234-35 (1993) (holding that exchanging a gun
for narcotics constitutes “use” of the gun within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994)).
For a more detailed discussion of Smith, see infra notes 154-157 and accompanying text.
14. In this way the plain meaning approach might be justified as a kind of “penalty” or
“information-eliciting” default rule. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (arguing that
the plain meaning rule appropriately encourages bargain-makers to adequately express their
intentions by penalizing them if they do not); Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia’s Democratic

SUNSTEIN DONE PG PROOF I.DOC

1018

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

10/29/98 4:18 PM

[Vol. 47: 1013

that, by wrenching statutory terms out of their context, it may well
lead to understandings of statutory terms that are quite different
from those of the enacting Congress and may, in that sense, produce
significant mistakes.15 The chief advantage of the contextual approach
is that it builds on a sensible understanding of how the governing
words were understood by ordinary people, including members of
Congress, at the time of enactment.16 Its disadvantage is that it increases the burdens of judicial judgments and may involve unreliable
speculation about the nature of the relevant context.
In the abstract, the choice between the two approaches is very
difficult.17 A key question is whether Congress would respond to the
literalist approach in the desired way, by legislating more clearly before the fact and by responding to any errors. To the extent that this
kind of legislative response is likely and to the extent that agencies
ought not be permitted to bring coercive power to bear in an area on
which Congress has not focussed, a court—if forced to decide the tobacco question on its own—might do well to hold that despite the
statute’s literal language, tobacco is not a drug within the meaning of
the FDCA because the term “drug” has a particular, highly contextual meaning.18 But a court presented with this question is not making
such a choice on its own.
Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529, 557 (1997) [hereinafter Sunstein, Democratic Formalism]
(explaining Justice Scalia’s approach to statutory interpretation as, in part, “a series of information-eliciting default rules” which ideally “encourage Congress to state its will clearly”). It
might also be justified as a low-cost method of allowing a wide range of people to converge on
a particular outcome. See Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 74
(arguing that the costs of strained readings of statutes so as to avoid constitutional invalidation
outweighs the benefits).
15. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law,
1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 429, 527 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s textualism for yielding decisions
unresponsive to the organic development of statutes); Richard J. Pierce, The Supreme Court’s
New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State,
95 Colum. L. Rev. 749, 752 (1995) (claiming that the recent enthusiasm of the Supreme Court
for textualism sometimes leads to “finding linguistic precision where it does not exist”).
16. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 845, 847 (1992) (defending the “classical practice” of using legislative history to
clarify ambiguous statutory language).
17. This choice depends on many factors: the competence of courts in uncovering contextual meaning, the likelihood of judicial bias or willfulness; the possibility that literalism will in
fact spur Congress to legislate more clearly, and the likelihood of congressional response to
judicial mistakes. These are all, in large part, empirical issues, awaiting investigation. Some
evidence is collected in William Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 335-53 (1991) (examining empirical studies of congressional
overrides of Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions).
18. This contextual meaning is discussed below, in Part III.
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The FDA has a large law-interpreting role and it has made some
distinctive findings in the case of tobacco that support its regulations.19 In light of those findings and that role, courts are not in a position to make independent judgments but only to say whether the
FDA’s interpretation is reasonable.20 In the end, I will argue that reviewing courts should uphold the regulation, principally by reference
to the appropriate role of contemporary administrative agencies.
C. Agencies as Common Law Courts
A general claim underlies this conclusion: without much fanfare,
agencies have become modern America’s common law courts, and
properly so. The basic task of common law courts is to specify abstract standards (often involving reasonableness) and to adapt legal
rules to particular contexts as facts, social understandings of facts,
and underlying values change over time. Operating as common law
courts, agencies have, as they should, considerable power to adapt
statutory language to changing understandings and circumstances.
This is a conventional role, for example, of the National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Trade Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Communications Commission, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, and the Internal Revenue Service.21 The
FDA’s conclusion that tobacco is a “drug” is merely an unusually
dramatic and visible illustration of this proposition.
This general claim is connected to a more particular one: under
the best reading of the FDCA, tobacco may or may not be a drug, but
the FDA has the legal authority to treat tobacco as a drug if it
19. The FDA first determined that nicotine in tobacco products is a drug. See FDA Regulations, supra note 1, at 44,403. The FDA then adopted regulations after finding that advertisements for tobacco products were specifically harming young people. See id. at 44,466-95.
20. This is the clear lesson of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
21. See, e.g., id. (holding that the EPA’s definition of the statutory term “stationary
source” was a permissible construction); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 184-189 (1991) (holding
that regulations issued by the Secretary of Health and Human Services were a permissible construction of Title X of the Public Health Services Act); Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508
U.S. 402, 414 (1993) (holding that when “[c]onfronted with an ambiguous statutory provision,
we will generally defer to a permissible interpretation espoused by the agency entrusted with
its implementation”); Torrington Extend-A-Care Employee Ass’n v. NLRB, 17 F.3d 580, 589
(2d Cir. 1994) (approving the NLRB’s interpretation of a statutory “inability to pay” requirement); Detroit/Wayne County Port Auth. v. ICC, 59 F.3d 1314, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(sustaining the decision of the ICC because it adopted a reasonable interpretation of the statute
in question).
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chooses to do so. One of my principal goals here is to show why this
is no contradiction. In the process I shall have occasion to discuss a
number of important interpretive questions: the relevance of subsequent legislative events; the uses and limits of literalism;22 the power
of an agency to change its mind after Congress and others have been
explicitly informed of the previous interpretation;23 the nature of
statutory default rules, operating as “information-eliciting” rules or
as “intention-eliciting” rules;24 and the exercise of dynamic statutory
interpretation by administrative agencies rather than courts.25
I. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notes on Smoking
The problems posed by cigarette smoking might, of course, fill
many volumes. I offer here a brief discussion as a way of providing
some context. It was estimated in 1995 that about 529,000 deaths in
the United States were attributable to smoking, about twenty-four
percent of total mortality that year.26 “Second-hand” smoke is said to
be responsible for 3,000 deaths from lung cancer and 37,000 deaths
from heart disease annually,27 though these numbers are controversial.28 In any case, there is general agreement that smoking is by far
the largest of the preventable causes of death,29 and “passive” smok-

22.
23.
24.
25.

See infra Part IV.C.
See infra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
See infra Part V.B. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION (1995) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC INTERPRETATION]. Professor
Eskridge focuses on dynamic statutory interpretation by courts, where my emphasis is on dynamic interpretation by administrative agencies, a different and, I believe, more legitimate enterprise.
26. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, TOBACCO OR HEALTH: A GLOBAL STATUS
REPORT 223 (1998) [hereinafter WHO]; see also Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of
Cigarettes, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1167 (1998) (claiming that smoking causes 420,000 annual
deaths, about 20% of all U.S. deaths annually).
27. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 26, at 1167; see also ROBERT E. GOODIN, NO
SMOKING 62 (1989) (estimating second-hand smoke as the cause of somewhere between 2,500
and 4,700 deaths per year).
28. See Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 4 F. Supp.2d 435, 450-63
(M.D.N.C. 1998) (accepting the tobacco companies’ assertion that the methodology used by the
EPA in finding a correlation between lung cancer deaths and second-hand smoke was faulty).
29. See J. Michael McGinnis & William H. Foege, Actual Causes of Death in the United
States, 270 JAMA 2207-08 (1993).
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ing is sometimes described as the third leading preventable cause of
deaths.30
A word about the prevalence of smoking is also in order.31 As of
about 1993, 25% of all Americans smoked; 27.7% of men and 22.5%
of women.32 This represents a decline from 44.1% of men and 31.5%
of women in 1970.33 Smoking among adult blacks is 26%, very close
to that of adult whites at 25.4%,34 but there was an intriguingly substantial decline among blacks between eighteen and twenty-four
years old from 1965 to 1992. In that group, the rate fell from 37.1% in
1965, to 31.8% in 1979, to 20.4% in 1987, to 4.4% in 1993, while the
rate among whites in the same age group fell from 38.4% in 1965 to
27.8% in 1987, but has remained more or less constant since that
time.35 Almost 80% of smokers began to smoke regularly at or before
the age of sixteen.36 In 1995, 21.6% of high school seniors smoked, a
significant increase over the 17.2% rate in 1992.37
The causes of reductions in smoking are disputed. It appears that
education, advertising restrictions, reduction of peer pressure, and
taxes may all contribute to changes in smoking levels.38 Social norms
may, for example, operate as subsidies or taxes to smoking behavior,
encouraging people to smoke when norms are a subsidy and encouraging them to cease smoking when norms are a tax.39 Public percep-

30. See Lisa Goldman & Stanton Glantz, Evaluation of Antismoking Advertising Campaigns, 279 JAMA 772, 772 (1998).
31. Estimated smoking rates vary slightly between sources, but nevertheless remain within
a fairly tight range. The data presented herein is drawn from diverse sources and is comparable
to the data presented by Professor Hersch in this issue. See Joni Hersch, Teen Smoking Behavior and the Regulatory Environment, 47 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1145-46 (1998) (summarizing smoking
data compiled by the Centers for Disease Control and the Census Bureau).
32. See WHO, supra note 26, at 221.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 222.
35. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 1995, at 144 (115th ed. 1995); see also Michael Ingrassia, Waiting to Exhale, NEWSWEEK, May 1, 1995, at 76, 76 (discussing the racial gap in youth smoking).
36. See WHO, supra note 26, at 222.
37. See id.
38. For various perspectives, see generally Hanson & Logue, supra note 26 (examining
models of regulation and concluding that victim-initiated incentive systems are the most efficient forms of cigarette regulation); GOODIN, supra note 27, (developing arguments against
smoking and moral explanations for anti-smoking efforts); W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKING: MAKING
THE RISKY DECISION 53-58 (1992) (showing a strong correlation between public awareness of
smoking risks and declining consumption of cigarettes).
39. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 910-14,
932-35 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Social Norms] (discussing how social norms create a divi-
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tions of greater hazard, in response to government action and other
public health warnings, also contribute to drops in smoking rates.40
Advertising bans appear to have had a significant effect in Canada,
Finland, New Zealand, and Norway.41 Antismoking advertising campaigns appear to have substantial effects as well. In particular, campaigns intended to delegitimize smoking by emphasizing the dangers
of second-hand smoke and the industry’s manipulation of smokers
seem to have been especially effective.42 Tobacco taxes also have
been found to have substantial consequences.43
Currently a complex network of laws controls cigarette smoking.
Every state now bans the sale and distribution of tobacco to those
under the age of eighteen.44 Congress has also enacted legislation controlling both cigarette labeling and advertising.45 Current taxes range
from 20% to 44% of the retail price of cigarettes, a sharp contrast to
other industrialized nations, where taxes range from 50% to 86% of
the retail price.46 A variety of federal and state laws regulate smoking
in public places.47 As of this writing, there are continuing discussions
sion between private judgments and public behavior by conferring benefits (subsidies) on appropriate behavior and imposing costs (taxes) on inappropriate behavior); see also Hersch, supra note 31, at 1158 (arguing that social norms—as reflected in state minimum age restrictions—are inversely correlated to teen smoking).
40. See VISCUSI, supra note 38, at 55 (noting that negative perceptions of smoking—and
reduction in smoking rates—have been triggered by events such as the publication of influential reports like the 1953 Sloan-Kettering report linking smoking and lung cancer, the 1964
governmental report on smoking, and congressional action in 1965, 1969, and 1984 to impose
cigarette or smoking warnings).
41. See WHO, supra note 22, at 61 (summarizing research results reported in L ONDON
ECON. & OPERATIONAL RES. DIV., DEP’T OF HEALTH, EFFECT OF TOBACCO ADVERTISING
ON TOBACCO CONSUMPTION (1992)).
42. See Goldman & Glantz, supra note 30, at 776 (discussing the effectiveness of antitobacco messages addressing addiction, cessation, youth access, and short- and long-term
health effects when targeted at youths and adults).
43. See Hersch, supra note 31, at 1167 (presenting evidence of a negative demand elasticity for tobacco and concluding that increased tobacco taxes would result in significant smoking
reductions, especially among teens).
44. See WHO, supra note 26, at 223; see also Hersch, supra note 31, at 1149 & tbl.1 (listing
state minimum smoking age provisions in force before 1992).
45. See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282
(1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1994)) (requiring that cigarette packaging bear a statement warning consumers that smoking may be hazardous to health); Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-252, 100 Stat. 30
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408 (1994)) (requiring that smokeless tobacco packaging bear a
label warning consumers of various health risks resulting from use).
46. See WHO, supra note 32, at 223.
47. See id. at 224 (noting that smoking has been banned in places ranging from the White
House and military areas (by the federal government) to restaurants and workplaces (by state
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about a tobacco “settlement” that would involve a resolution of
pending civil cases against the tobacco industry, an increase in tobacco taxes, and the provision of funds for education and prevention
of smoking by young people.48
There is a substantial debate about the appropriate role of government in regulating the sale and use of tobacco products. On one
view, people are now adequately informed about the risks of smoking, and the basic task of government should be to promote the operation of the market for safer cigarettes.49 Others believe that this
argument understates the role of addiction and the motivational and
cognitive issues raised by risk-taking by young people.50 Still others
focus on the possible existence of unrealistic optimism in risk-taking
behavior and also on the problems presented by cumulative risks.51
There is a further question about the government’s appropriate role
when choices are a function of social norms over which people have
little control, and which they wish to change; this phenomenon makes
it unclear what it means to say that government should respect people’s preferences or choices.52
B. What the FDA Did
For a number of decades, the FDA disclaimed the general legal
authority to regulate tobacco, and Congress and others operated under the assumption that tobacco would not generally be subject to
FDA authority. Until 1963, there was no serious discussion of
whether tobacco products might generally qualify as a “drug.” Inand local governments)).
48. See, e.g., Tobacco Settlement Excerpts, supra note 5, at B8.
49. See VISCUSI, supra note 38, at 70-72, 146-49; W. Kip Viscusi, Constructive Cigarette
Regulation, 47 DUKE L.J. 1095 (1998) (arguing for safety through market competition).
50. See GOODIN, supra note 27, at 20-30 (arguing that the incremental nature of both nicotine addiction and long-term health consequences of smoking raises questions about whether or
not people “voluntarily” accept the risks of cigarette smoking).
51. See Paul Slovic, Do Adolescent Smokers Know the Risks?, 47 DUKE L.J. 1133, 1136-37
(1998) (discussing the effects of optimism biases and the tendency to perceive cumulative risks
as less threatening than noncumulative risks).
52. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 103942 (1995) (discussing how, after the rejection of an anti-begging penal law on First Amendment
grounds in Loper v. New York City Police Department, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993), the New
York Transit Authority was able to curb the incidence of begging by promoting a social norm
that made it acceptable to say no to panhandlers); Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 39, at
939-41, 953-59 (discussing the connection between personal choices and prevailing social norms
and positing that the government should engage in harm management to solve collective action
problems).
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deed, the only real assertion of FDA authority over tobacco products
prior to that time occurred in 1959, when the since-renamed Federal
Drug Administration claimed authority only because certain cigarette companies had advertised that their cigarettes would reduce
body weight.53 Between 1963 and 1988, FDA officials said explicitly
that tobacco products did not otherwise qualify as drugs, devices,
foods, or cosmetics.54 Thus, the FDA Commissioner testified in 1972
that cigarettes would be counted as drugs if, and only if, claims about
beneficial physical effects were made on their behalf;55 that is to say
that cigarettes would qualify as drugs only if tobacco companies marketed them by reference to their beneficial effects on the human
body. This view was consistently maintained through 1988.56
In an important decision in the late 1970s, the FDA rejected petitions by an anti-smoking group—Action on Smoking and Health—
to regulate cigarettes as drugs.57 The FDA concluded that there was
insufficient evidence that cigarettes were “intended” to affect the
structure or function of the body.58 By this, the FDA meant that those
who sold cigarettes did not “intend,” by express representation or
53. See United States v. 354 Bulk Cartons . . . Trim Reducing-Aid Cigarettes, 178 F. Supp.
847, 851 (D.N.J. 1959) (stating that, in light of the manufacturer’s appetite suppression claims,
the cigarettes seized were drugs within the meaning of the FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)); see
also United States v. 46 Cartons . . . Fairfax Cigarettes, 113 F. Supp. 336, 339 (D.N.J. 1953)
(finding that Fairfax Cigarettes fell within the statutory meaning of “drug” as leaflets seized
with cigarettes described a “miracle vapor” that could reduce the frequency of respiratory diseases).
54. See Memorandum from Bureau of Enforcement, Food and Drug Administration, to
Directors of Bureaus and Divisions and Directors of Districts, Food and Drug Administration
(May 23, 1963), reprinted in Public Health Cigarette Amendments of 1971: Hearings on S. 1454
Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong. 240 (1972)
[hereinafter Hearings on S. 1454]; Health Consequences of Smoking: Nicotine Addiction: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t of the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce,
100th Cong. 17 (1988) [hereinafter Hearing on Health Consequences of Smoking] (statement of
Dr. Frank E. Young, Comm’r, FDA).
55. See Hearings on S. 1454, supra note 54, at 239 (statement of Dr. Charles C. Edwards,
Comm’r, FDA).
56. See Hearing on Health Consequences of Smoking, supra note 54, at 17-19 (statement of
Dr. Frank E. Young, Comm’r, FDA).
57. The history of this petition and its rejection is summarized in Action on Smoking and
Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 237-38 (D.C. Cir. 1980), which affirmed the FDA’s position that
cigarettes containing nicotine could not be regulated as “drugs” under the FDCA. The plaintiffs had also asserted that cigarettes should be subject to regulation as “devices,” but the court
expressly declined to decide that issue. See id. at 237 n.4.
58. See id. at 239 (noting that “[s]uch an understanding has now been accepted as a matter
of statutory interpretation” and citing National Nutritional Foods Association v. Mathews, 557
F.2d 325, 333 (2d Cir. 1977) (“The vendors’ intent in selling the product to the public is the key
element in this statutory definition.”)).
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otherwise, to affect people’s bodies. Such an intention could, of
course, be found when cigarettes were marketed and sold as a means
of reducing weight, but not in the ordinary course of sale.59 The
FDA’s decision was upheld on appeal.60 The court said that the
FDCA authorized the FDA to regulate tobacco only if tobacco companies were marketing cigarettes by reference to various physiological benefits of smoking, and if most smokers used a particular brand
of cigarettes partly because of those supposed benefits.61
In 1988, the American Heart Association and other public health
organizations petitioned the FDA to regulate low-tar cigarettes as
drugs. The FDA responded by announcing its intention to reconsider
whether it had jurisdiction over cigarettes and smokeless tobacco. In
1996, the FDA concluded that it did indeed have jurisdiction in a
dense report of some seven hundred pages.62
The scientific and political background leading to this decision is
undoubtedly worth an article, or perhaps a book, of its own.63 For
present purposes, two points seem both clear and highly relevant to
the legal issue. First, this was an extremely visible political issue, one
in which the President himself was heavily involved and one that
played a serious part in the presidential election of 1996.64 Second, the
FDA’s decision would not have been possible without a great deal of
relatively new evidence about the effects of nicotine and the intentions of the tobacco industry. The evidence suggested that smoking is
responsible for more than 400,000 premature deaths per year.65 It also
suggested that tobacco companies were well aware of the adverse

59. See supra note 53 (citing cases).
60. See Action on Smoking and Health, 655 F.2d at 239.
61. See id.
62. See FDA Regulations, supra note 4, at 44,399-413. In 1995, the FDA had published a
report finding probable jurisdiction over “nicotine in cigarettes and smokeless tobacco,” but
withheld a final assertion of jurisdiction at that time, “recogniz[ing] the unique importance of
the jurisdictional issue as well as the factual justification for any proposed rule in this area.” See
FDA Jurisdictional Analysis, supra note 8, at 41,453.
63. At least one author has found it worthy of a book. See RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO
ASHES: AMERICA’S HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETTE WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE
UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORRIS (1996).
64. See, e.g., William Neikirk, Clinton Readies Tobacco Crackdown: Proposed Rules Take
Aim at Teen Smoking and Could Open the Door to FDA Regulation, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 22, 1996,
at 1.
65. See FDA Regulations, supra note 4, at 44,398 (citing CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Cigarette Smoking - Attributable Mortality
and Years of Potential Life Lost - United States 1990, 42 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 645, 645-49 (1993)).
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physical effects of smoking.66 The FDA stressed its conviction by
stating that smoking was a far more important public health problem
than those to which it ordinarily devoted its attention. Thus, in its
own statement, the FDA said that smoking causes more deaths annually in the United States than AIDS, car accidents, murders, suicides,
fires, alcohol, and illegal drugs combined.67 Nonetheless, about fifty
million Americans continue to smoke cigarettes, and 3,000 minors
begin to smoke every day.68
With respect to the jurisdictional issue, the FDA supported its
view with two central conclusions. First, it said that tobacco affects
the structure or function of the body because (a) it causes and sustains addiction, (b) it has mood-altering affects, such as stimulation
and tranquilization, and (c) it controls weight.69 Second, and most important for purposes of its change in view, the FDA stressed that tobacco products are intended to have these effects.70 This conclusion
resulted from new evidence of the foreseeability of these various
physical effects, new evidence of consumer use, and new evidence of
manufacturer intent, stemming from three decades of industry statements and research.71
The FDA emphasized that the situation had changed dramatically from 1980,72 when no major health organization had determined
that nicotine was addictive, to 1995, by which time most major public
health organizations—including the American Psychiatric Association, the U.S. Surgeon General, and the American Psychological Association—had concluded that tobacco was addictive.73 There was
also a great deal of emerging evidence, since 1980, to support this
conclusion—and the conclusion that smoking had various stimulating
and sedating effects, effects intended by tobacco companies.74

66. See, e.g., id. at 44,870-71 (discussing internal memoranda circulating within the R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. which made reference to the “undesirable” physical effects of smoking).
67. See id. at 44,398. Note, however, that smoking may also control behavior that would
otherwise lead to premature deaths, such as obesity; the figure of 400,000 lives lost does not
take account of losses that would be produced in any case, as a result of substitute or offsetting
behavior.
68. See id.
69. See FDA Jurisdictional Analysis, supra note 8, at 41,524-28, 41,534-79.
70. See id. at 41,471-91.
71. See id. at 41,582-779.
72. This was the year that the court decided Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris, 655
F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
73. See Jurisdictional Analysis, supra note 5, at 41,539-46.
74. A set of internal documents showed that tobacco manufacturers had called nicotine
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The FDA did not, however, ban nicotine.75 It concluded that a
ban would be ineffective, because it would produce black markets
and smuggling, and that it would be undesirable, because it would
create adverse health consequences for the millions now dependent
on nicotine.76 It decided that the best response would be to prevent
children and adolescents from beginning to use cigarettes at all.77 To
this end, the FDA invoked its “restricted device” authority78 and
adopted a regulatory strategy with two principal components.79 First,
the FDA attempted to limit the access of young people to cigarettes
in the following ways: by prohibiting the sale of cigarettes to people
under eighteen years of age; by requiring retailers to check photographic identification; by banning free samples; by requiring retailers
to remove self-service displays; and by prohibiting the use of vending
machines for selling cigarettes.80 Second, the FDA attempted to limit
the desire of young people to smoke by restricting cigarette advertising and promotion. The restrictions included a requirement that
advertising use a black and white, text-only format;81 a ban on outdoor advertising near schools and playgrounds;82 a prohibition on the
sale or distribution of non-tobacco products, such as hats or T-shirts,
with a tobacco product brand name or logo;83 and a prohibition on
tobacco brand name sponsorship of athletic, cultural, or similar
events.84
II. TEXTUALISM AND HISTORY
Now let us turn to the legal issues. The critical language of the
FDCA defines “drugs” as “articles . . . intended to affect the structure or any function of the body.”85 Is tobacco an article that is inhabit-forming, with the power to sedate or tranquilize its users. See id. at 41,591.
75. My focus here is purely whether tobacco products can be regulated as “drugs,” and
hence I do not discuss, except in passing, the more specific questions raised by the particular
way in which the FDA chose to regulate such products.
76. See FDA Regulations, supra note 1, at 44,398.
77. See id.
78. Recall that the court had expressly declined to decide this issue in Action on Smoking
and Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 237 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
79. See FDA Regulations, supra note 1, at 44,403-07.
80. See 21 C.F.R. § 897.14 (1996).
81. See 21 C.F.R. § 897.32(a) (1996).
82. See 21 C.F.R. § 897.30(b) (1996).
83. See 21 C.F.R. § 897.34(a) (1996).
84. See 21 C.F.R. § 897.34(c) (1996).
85. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (1994). For the reasons given above in note 8, I do not deal
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tended to affect the structure or any function of the body? Let us begin by generating an argument on behalf of the FDA, emphasizing
the apparently literal meaning of the statutory text and attempting to
account for the change in the FDA’s position over time.
A. Text
At first glance, the text of the definition of “drug” plainly includes tobacco, or so a reasonable FDA, acting on the basis of plausible factual assumptions, could find.
The statute appears to require two and only two findings: (1) an
effect on the structure or any function of the body and (2) an intention to produce that effect. Tobacco has a series of effects on the human body, at least on one reading of the evidence. Nicotine may reasonably be found to work as both a stimulant and a sedative and also
to have addictive properties. On the question of intent, things are a
bit more complicated. What is the precise meaning of “intended”?
Does this term require knowledge, motivation, or something else? By
itself, the text does not make this clear. In the context of tobacco,
however, there is evidence that tobacco companies not only knew
about but also desired the various effects of nicotine.86
Thus, the natural reading of the text appears to be strongly supportive of the FDA. It suggests not ambiguity but a relatively clear
understanding like that of the current FDA. An ordinary English
reader would probably find that tobacco is a drug in light of the two
statutory requirements.
B. The Original Understanding of FDA Authority Over Tobacco
The text of the statute may not be decisive if the traditional tools
of statutory construction lead to a contrary result. In Part II, I will
discuss this point in connection with the strongest argument against
the FDA. But it makes sense to begin with a simpler, more straightforward, and, in a way, more obvious set of questions: What of the
original understanding about whether tobacco fell within the term
“drug?” Does Congress’s original understanding of the place of tohere with the issue of whether cigarettes are “devices” as that term is defined under 21 U.S.C. §
321(h) (1994).
86. See Nicotine in Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Is a Drug and These Products Are
Nicotine Delivery Devices Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: Jurisdictional
Determination, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,619, 44,690-806, 44,847-45,097, 45,098-150 (1996) [hereinafter
Jurisdictional Determination]; FDA Jurisdictional Analysis, supra note 8, at 41,582-603.
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bacco argue against a literal interpretation of the text? What is the
importance of the (exceedingly likely) fact that the enacting Congress
did not intend to give the FDA power over tobacco?
When the definition of “drug” was originally enacted in 1938, it
seems clear at first glance that the term was not understood to include tobacco products.87 There was no discussion of the FDA’s
authority over tobacco products in Congress that year, and the silence is highly relevant: in view of the importance and high visibility
of the tobacco industry, it defies belief to suggest that Congress was
conferring that authority without debate or by inadvertence. It is entirely reasonable to think that the battle over the 1938 bill would
have been far more intense if the bill was meant to give the FDA this
kind of regulatory control; it is even reasonable to think that a statute
giving the FDA such authority could not possibly have been enacted.
Moreover, the FDA’s predecessor agency said in 1914 that it could
not regulate tobacco products under the 1906 Act,88 and Congress did
not enact an explicit proposal in 1929 that would have amended the
1906 Act to cover tobacco products.89
Thus, it could be argued that the statutory term should be understood by reference to its original meaning, which did not include tobacco. By itself, however, this argument is quite weak. The basic reason is simple: Congress enacted general words, not its beliefs about
particular applications of those general words, and Congress’s unenacted beliefs about those applications need not control. When Congress enacts such general words, it is usually their present meaning
that governs,90 at least if the question is whether the agency charged

87. The qualification “at first glance” is necessary because it is unclear whether at that
time Congress would have been taken to have referred to existing understandings of what
counted as drugs and devices, or to have set out a general concept whose particular content
would and should vary over time, with new understandings of facts and values. If the second
view, which envisions an evolving definition of what constitutes a “drug” under the Act, is correct, then Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA is rightly decided even under Justice Scalia’s view of interpretation, rooted, as it is, in textualism. 966 F. Supp. 1374 (M.D.N.C. 1997). The court in
Beahm adopted an expansive view of the term “drug” as used within the FDCA and concluded
that Congress’s failure to address tobacco within the Act when enacted did not withhold FDA
authority to regulate tobacco products today. See id. at 1380-81. In reality, it is unlikely that
there was a general understanding on Congress’s part about whether the statutory definition
was static or meant to change over time.
88. See id. at 1381.
89. See id.
90. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1001-02 (1998) (holding
that workplace harassment can violate Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination “because
of sex” when the harasser and the harassed employee are of the same sex);.

SUNSTEIN DONE PG PROOF I.DOC

1030

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

10/29/98 4:18 PM

[Vol. 47: 1013

with their interpretation may so conclude.91 History may help in
sorting out ambiguities, but when they are unambiguous, general
words are frequently applied in ways that enacting legislatures could
not have anticipated and would not, on their particular, time-bound
understanding of facts and even values, have approved.92 The validity
of such applications is especially clear where, as here, factual understandings have changed dramatically since the statute was written.
We might make several distinctions here. Sometimes agencies alter their interpretation of law because the facts have changed or have
been understood in a new way.93 Sometimes agencies change their interpretations of law because of new values.94 Sometimes agencies
change their interpretations not because of new facts or new values
but because of a somewhat different evaluation of the evidence.95
Consider that it is generally agreed that the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)96 authorizes the EPA to
regulate DDT as a product raising “a substantial question” of human
safety,97 but that this authority does not rest on a judgment that the
91. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 605 (1983) (upholding the IRS’s
decision not to grant tax exempt status to a university which did not permit partners in interracial marriages to enroll because the university’s practice was “contrary to public policy”); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 593 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that
the Secretary of Agriculture’s interpretation of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act governs except in cases of abuse of discretion). But see Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118,
118 (1967) (holding that an “alien who was a homosexual over a continuous and uninterrupted
period prior to and at time of entry was ‘afflicted’ with psychopathic personality within terms of
[the INS’s interpretation of the]statute excluding such persons from admission into United
States”)
92. See, e.g., Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 592-93, 598-99 (holding that prohibition of interracial
marriages within educational institutions is contrary to public policy despite the fact that such
discrimination was thought consistent with public policy in the first half of this century); Environmental Defense Fund, 439 F.2d at 593-95 (noting that despite an administrative recognition
of “a substantial question concerning the safety of DDT” that was not present at the time of the
enaction of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, the pesticide’s registration
was not suspended); Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001-02 (holding that although Title VII was not enacted with such a claim in mind, “nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination
‘because . . . of sex’ merely because the plaintiff and the defendant . . . are of the same sex”).
93. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, 439 F.2d at 596-97 (recognizing agency’s interpretation of factors determined to be relevant in implementing statutory purpose).
94. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding changed interpretation of
law prohibiting grant of federal funds to clinics where abortion is a “method of family planning”).
95. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 865 (1984) (upholding new EPA air quality regulations in light of new scientific understanding).
96. Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (1972) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1994)).
97. Environmental Defense Fund, 439 F.2d at 593-95 & n.3 (construing the EPA’s author-
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Congress that enacted FIFRA believed that the EPA could regulate
DDT. On the contrary, when introduced, DDT was thought to be
unproblematic and entirely safe,98 and hence the enacting Congress
did not contemplate that FIFRA would authorize EPA regulation of
DDT. The EPA nevertheless possesses just such authority. Statutes
regulating health and safety quite routinely contain broad language
authorizing agencies to regulate articles or substances if the statutory
criteria are met. Whether Congress believed that the statutory criteria were met when it enacted the relevant legislation is beside the
point unless Congress embodied that belief in law. Consider, as well,
the prominent example of Bob Jones University v. United States,99 in
which the Court held that a public policy exception to the category of
charitable deductions disallowed deductions for gifts to schools prohibiting interracial marriages—notwithstanding the fact that when
the charitable deduction was first enacted in 1918, segregated schools
were thought entirely consistent with public policy.100 As the Court
wrote in 1998, “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal
evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the
provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”101 Then the Court held that the
1964 Civil Rights Act bans same-sex harassment, even though the
1964 Congress did not in the least have that problem in mind, or intend to cover it.102
We can make the point more plain by supposing that in floor debates in 1938, members of Congress expressly stated the view that the
Act did not authorize the FDA to regulate tobacco, on the ground
(for example) that tobacco did not create a serious health threat or
did not “affect the structure or function of the body.”103 A scenario of
this sort would be at least as strong and perhaps even stronger for
those attacking the FDA regulation than the actual case, for, in the
hypothesized situation, there would be explicit legislative history
against the FDA’s view. Even if, however, there were an express
statement to this effect in the legislative history, it would not be conity under FIFRA).
98. See AARON WILDAVSKY, BUT IS IT TRUE? 55-57 (1996).
99. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
100. See id. at 592-93, 598-99.
101. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002-03 (1998) (concluding that
“sex discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII”).
102. See id. at 1002.
103. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (1994).
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trolling. What matters is the language of the enactment, not the particular, unenacted understanding of how that language applies to a
particular case.104 Congress’s judgment that tobacco was not a “drug”
would, in the hypothesized case, have been a product of certain factual judgments, judgments that have proved inaccurate. It does no
violence to the statute to read it to authorize a different decision
about tobacco once the facts have been revealed to be otherwise.
If the language were ambiguous, the legislative understanding
could be helpful in untangling the ambiguity.105 But if the language is
general, and if it invites the FDA to inquire into relevant issues of
fact, then there is no problem with an interpretation by the FDA that
understands the ban to apply to articles not originally thought, by
Congress, to be subject to ban. The enterprise proposed by the tobacco industry is not the legitimate one of using legislative history to
untangle ambiguities, but the illegitimate one of using it to decide on
appropriate application, which, under the statute, is the FDA’s job.
All this leads to a simple conclusion. The text of the statute favors the FDA’s approach; the literal meaning argues strongly in its
direction. While the history of the statute suggests that Congress did
not contemplate FDA regulation of tobacco, what is controlling is the
language, not Congress’s understanding of how the language would
be applied. Since the underlying facts have come to be understood in
a new way,106 the FDA regulation is lawful. It is easy to imagine a
straightforward opinion that would affirm the FDA’s authority on
the basis of an argument like this.
This argument is quite formalistic in the sense that it deals with
words and definitions rather than with goals and policies. Perhaps its
formal character is an advantage; certainly recent Supreme Court
opinions so suggest.107 But the formal argument might be strength-

104. This view should hold even for those who believe that legislative history is entitled to
weight in resolving ambiguities; I am supposing here that the text is unambiguous.
105. See Breyer, supra note 16, at 848 (defending the use of “legislative history to help interpret unclear statutory language”).
106. See FDA Jurisdictional Analysis, supra note 5 at 41,539-46, 41,591 (presenting evidence that major public health organizations have recently become aware that tobacco companies intended for smoking to have various stimulating and sedating effects).
107. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002 (arguing that “it is ultimately the provisions of our laws
rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed”); see also
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 16-23 (1997) [hereinafter SCALIA,
INTERPRETATION] (defending formalism). For an illuminating discussion of literal interpretations, see Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Legal Positivism as Legal Information, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 1080, 1083-96 (1997) (suggesting that positivism entails a constraint on the
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ened, rather than weakened, with a more pragmatic understanding of
why it might make sense for Congress to have given the FDA
authority in certain kinds of cases. Very plausibly, the purpose of the
FDCA108 is to allow the FDA to act in circumstances in which consumers are unlikely to be well informed about products with physiological effects; foods, drugs, and cosmetics are substances for which
the risk of poor information and poor information processing are especially high. On this view, the FDA’s proper business goes well beyond the prevention of fraud and deception, a task that it shares with
other administrative agencies such as the FTC. The FDA’s jurisdiction is properly invoked by products with medicinal or therapeutic
effects, or products otherwise intended to affect bodily structure or
function, because it is in these cases that full information may be hard
for consumers to obtain or to process, and the risk of harm is especially great.
The regulation of tobacco as a drug fits comfortably with this rationale for FDA authority. Those who smoke may well be unlikely to
know the various effects of smoking, or to admit that those risks apply to them as individuals.109 Perhaps the risks of smoking are wellunderstood,110 and perhaps Congress should not allow regulation in
such contexts; but the FDA has been granted the relevant power in a
whole class of cases involving effects on the structure or function of
the body.111 It is also irrelevant to complain that the FDA, thus understood, is unacceptably paternalistic. That may be true, but Congress granted the FDA authority to act even if the action appears pasources to which judges may look in deciding legal questions).
108. The purpose is not a “fact” to be “found,” of course; it is something to be characterized, consistently with the relevant legal materials.
109. See Slovic, supra note 51, at 1142 (concluding that young smokers, despite a general
recognition of the risks associated with smoking, nevertheless fail to appreciate the “severity of
the disease consequences, . . . the cumulative nature of smoking risks, and . . . the difficulty of
stopping the behavior once it has been initiated”); see also GOODIN, supra note 27, at 20
(arguing that individuals may not know the risks because “tobacco companies in effect are
giving out . . . conflicting information . . . [because] implicit health claims of the advertising imagery conflict with explicit health warnings”). But see VISCUSI, supra note 38, at 61-86
(reporting the risk perceptions of smokers and noting that many overestimate the risks of
smoking, which include lung cancer and shortened life).
110. See VISCUSI, supra note 38, at 70-72 (reporting that “[a]pproximately 70 percent of the
population has heard that cigarette smoking is dangerous to your health”).
111. See, e.g., United States v. Pro-Ag, Inc., 968 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming FDA
jurisdiction over products designed to increase animals’ milk production by altering structure
or function of their bodies); United States v. Undetermined Quantities of Cal-Ban 3000, 776 F.
Supp. 249 (E.D.N.C. 1991) (affirming FDA jurisdiction over products marketed for purposes of
weight reduction, appetite suppression, and cancer prevention).
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ternalistic, and there is at least an intelligible account, stemming from
an absence of consumer information, for such a grant of authority.
III. CONTEXTUALISM AND THE ORDINARY PICTURE IN THE
COMMON MIND
What is the best response to this argument? As noted, the
FDCA defines “drug” in relevant part to include articles “intended to
affect the structure or any function of the body,”112 but these words
were written in a particular setting, and they may not mean all of
what they appear to mean. Would it follow from a literal interpretation that the FDA could, or perhaps must, define as “drugs” exercise
machines, chewing tobacco, certain bracelets said to counteract arthritis, bras, word processors, even radio and television? If at least
some of these “articles” are not within FDA authority, what, in a
world of literalism, can prevent the FDA from so concluding?
A. From Text to Context: The Contextual Understanding of “Drug”
The answer might involve starting not only with text, but also
with context, placing particular emphasis on the ordinary understanding of the controlling statutory term: “drug.” Of course, Congress, like Lewis Carroll’s famous Humpty Dumpty in Through the
113
Looking Glass, can define terms however it wishes; it might define
“drugs” to include horses, bulletin boards, works by Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., or law reviews if it wishes. But ordinary usage surely
matters, and we should not lightly assume that Congress has defined
the term “drug” in a way that departs radically from the ordinary understanding of the term. The argument made in Part II—with its extremely expansive conception of what can be counted as a drug—
might be seen to make this error. Congress’s definition does, of
course, govern; but in case of doubt, there is reason to favor an understanding of that definition that conforms to and does not violate
the ordinary understanding.
In the specific context of a regulatory agency charged with the
task of regulating “food” and “drugs,” an ordinary English-language
reader, in 1906, 1938, or 1998, would think that the basic cases in112. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (1994).
113. “‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, ‘it means just
what I choose it to mean—nothing more or less.’” LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING
GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE, in THE ILLUSTRATED LEWIS CARROLL 103, 168
(Roy Gasson ed., 1978) (1872).
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volving a “drug” refer to articles used to help cure or alleviate some
illness, disease, or medical condition.114 These are the basic exemplars
from which interpretation should proceed.115 Indeed, the statute defines “drugs” to include articles of exactly this kind.116 The specific
subsection with which we have been dealing is a separate one, applying not to articles that help with a disease or illness but to “articles
(other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of
the body.”117
In the particular context of a statutory definition of “drug,” what
is the basic purpose or function of this subsection? Without looking
at history, but instead looking at the context (this is after all an attempted definition of “drug”), it seems reasonable to think that the
provision covers products that would not cure or alleviate an illness
or disease, but that are nonetheless marketed (or “intended”) to alter
body structure or function by, for example, fighting colds,118 smoothing skin,119 helping to produce weight loss,120 reducing odors,121 or
(more exotically) tying off severed blood vessels during medical procedures.122 All of these cases involve “drugs” in the ordinary English

114. It might be possible to respond that the term “drug” can be understood to refer to cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and so forth, and thus that the FDA definition of tobacco as a drug is
not so counterintuitive after all. In ordinary language, “drug” has come to refer to narcotics. I
am speaking of the ordinary meaning of drug in the context of the FDCA, where the term drug
is not rooted in illegal substances, but quasi-medical ones.
115. Cf. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-32 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the communication of general legal standards through individuals’ recognition of verbal terms). For
psychological work in this vein, see PAUL M. CHURCHLAND, THE ENGINE OF REASON, THE
SEAT OF THE SOUL: A PHILOSOPHICAL JOURNEY INTO THE BRAIN 253-98 (1995) (discussing
the human ability to interpret information based on dynamic paradigms or prototypes).
116. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(B) (1994) (“articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals”).
117. Id. § 321(g)(1)(C).
118. See United States v. 46 Cartons . . . Fairfax Cigarettes, 113 F. Supp. 336, 339 (D.N.J.
1953) (holding that cigarettes are within statutory meaning of “drug” when advertisement’s
“clear import” is that smoking will prevent colds or other viral infections).
119. See United States v. An Article . . . “Sudden Change”, 409 F.2d 734, 742 (2d Cir. 1969)
(holding that a product which claims to “lift out puffs” and to give a “face lift without surgery”
is a drug).
120. See United States v. 354 Bulk Cartons . . . Trim Reducing-Aid Cigarettes, 178 F. Supp.
847, 851 (D.N.J. 1959) (holding that the “Trim cigarette” is a drug because it is intended to
promote weight loss).
121. See United States v. Undetermined Quantities . . . “Pet Smellfree,” 22 F.3d 235, 239
(10th Cir. 1994) (holding that a food additive for pets was a “drug” because it contained an antibiotic to reduce pet odors).
122. See AMP, Inc. v. Gardner, 389 F.2d 825, 830 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that products used
for tying off several blood vessels during surgery were “drugs”).
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language sense because the relevant articles are marketed in order to
alter bodily structure or function in a certain desirable way and, thus,
belong in the same basic family as the ordinary exemplars of drugs in
the specific context of a regulatory agency charged with regulating
“food” and “drugs.”
On this count, cigarettes are altogether different. Manufacturers
may know about the addictive properties of cigarettes and may even
be delighted with those effects. Cigarettes are not, however, sold and
purchased because of a promotional campaign emphasizing their
drug-like effects, that is, their effects on the structure and function of
the human body. If and when they are so treated, they might fit
within the category “drug”—otherwise not.
B. History
This is the start of a less literal and more contextual understanding of the definition of “drug;” it is strongly supported by the
history of the FDCA. In fact, an investigation of the history provides
some support for the general view, associated with Justice Breyer,
that investigations of this kind can help illuminate the meaning of
statutory provisions that might otherwise be misunderstood.123
In 1906, the term “drug” had been defined to mean “all medicines and preparations recognized in the United States Pharmacopoeia or National Formulary for internal or external use, and any
substance or mixture of substances intended to be used for the cure,
mitigation, or prevention of disease in man or other animals.”124 This
relatively narrow definition led to a concern about the need for a
broader definition to enable the FDA to control remedies for obesity
and cosmetics.125 The expanded definition, enacted in 1938, with its

123. See Breyer, supra note 16, at 851-53 (noting the value of looking to legislative history
to establish the “specialized meanings” of certain terms as they are used in specific statutes).
124. Pure Food and Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, § 6, ch. 3915, 24 Stat. 768, 769 (1906).
This early definition remains strongly echoed in the current provision, see 21 U.S.C. §
321(g)(1)(A)-(B) (1994), which is quoted above in the text accompanying note 7.
125. This concern was noted as early as 1917 by the Chief of the Bureau of Chemistry, the
precursor to the FDA responsible for enforcing the 1906 Act:
While the accomplishments of the Food and Drugs Act have been considerable, it
must be admitted that it has its serious limitations. Especially conspicuous ones
are . . . the limitations placed upon the term “drug” by definition which render it difficult to control injurious cosmetics, fraudulent mechanical devices used for therapeutic purposes, as well as fraudulent remedies for obesity and leanness.
BUREAU OF CHEMISTRY, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 1917 BUREAU OF CHEMISTRY ANN. REP.,
reprinted in FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG AND COSMETIC LAW—ADMIN. REPS., 1907–1949, at 355,
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addition of “articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure
or any function of the body,”126 was designed partly to enable the
FDA to control “slenderizing” remedies and related practices.127
Thus, the Chief of the FDA, W.G. Campbell, explained in a key
statement:
Let me tell you the purpose of that [expanded definition]. There are
products on the market now that escape control under [existing law],
such as slenderizing products, reducing products. Obesity is not itself
a disease in all instances and products advocated and sold for the
treatment of obesity, as a matter of fact, are not always subject to
the terms of this act.
In regard to slenderizing products, it is fashionable, on the part of
girls, or it has been, to attain a sylphlike slender figure. They are victims, in such circumstances, of the sale of products that are capable
of really injuring their health. There was one such article . . . ,
“Marmola” . . . . That product is a powerful drug. It ought not to be
administered except under the direction of physicians. . . . Now, the
purpose of that paragraph (3) is to give jurisdiction over that prod128
uct.

Campbell indicated that when questions arose about whether a hard
case involved a statutory drug, the FDA would focus on the nature of
representations made by the manufacturer.129 Hence, a chiropractor’s
table would not qualify as a drug unless the manufacturer decided “to
ship that table into interstate commerce, and say that that table
would cure various ills.”130 The FDA’s jurisdiction “would depend al-

370 (1951).
126. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (1994).
127. See S. Rep. No. 73-493, at 2 (1934) (“Such expansion of the definition of the term
‘drug’ is essential if the consumer is to be protected against a multiplicity of devices and such
preparations as ‘slenderizers,’ many of which are worthless at best and some of which are distinctly dangerous to health.”).
128. Foods, Drugs and Cosmetics: Hearings on S. 2800 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 73d Cong. 516 (1934) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 2800] (statement of W.G. Campbell,
Chief, FDA). The paragraph to which Dr. Campbell referred listed one of the alternative definitions of “drug” offered in S. 2800: “[t]he term “drug” . . . includes . . . (3) all substances and
preparations, other than food, and all devices intended to affect the structure or any function of
the body.” Id. at 1 (quoting S. 2800, 73d Cong. § 2 (1933)).
129. See id. at 514-16 (statement of W.G. Campbell, Chief, FDA) (discussing whiskey, a
product generally regarded as a drug but purchased as a beverage, and indicating that if sold as
a beverage it would not fall within the definition of “drug” provided in the bill).
130. Id. at 517 (statement of W.G. Campbell, Chief, FDA).
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together on the character of the representation.”131 Campbell said, in
response to a question about the extent of jurisdiction:
[There] is no interference at all with the manufacture, with the marketing, with the use of such product. This is only when someone goes
to the extreme of converting that thing into a drug, according to this
definition, and making preposterous and ridiculous representations
132
about it that there would be any jurisdiction under this law.

The product referred to in the quoted passage was an ordinary lamp.
Campbell suggested that such an ordinary product would qualify for
regulation if and only if it were marketed under “a preposterous representation,” for example as a cure for blindness.133 Even a belt, used
to help fix an injured back, was “admittedly a drug in some circumstances.”134
These are highly suggestive comments. They suggest that the
statutory phrase “intended to affect the structure or function of the
body” was not designed to authorize the FDA to affect every item or
“article,” other than food, that affected bodies. Instead, it was intended to allow the FDA to go beyond articles that are responsive to
a preexisting medical condition by regulating those that are alleged to
have beneficial or therapeutic effects on the body.
C. Practice
Past FDA practice is consistent with this view. In every judicial
decision upholding FDA authority, the product held to fall within the
“intended to affect” provision had been marketed pursuant to manufacturer representations about its intended use.135 In such cases, the
FDA asserted authority over products said, implicitly or explicitly, to

131. Id. (statement of W.G. Campbell, Chief, FDA).
132. Id. at 518 (statement of W.G. Campbell, Chief, FDA).
133. Id. (statement of W.G. Campbell, Chief, FDA).
134. Id. at 516 (statement of W.G. Campbell, Chief, FDA).
135. See, e.g., United States v. An Article . . . “Sudden Change”, 409 F.2d 734, 739 (2d Cir.
1969) (upholding FDA jurisdiction over a cosmetic product because manufacturer represented
it as able to provide a “face lift without surgery”); National Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. FDA,
504 F.2d 761, 789 (2d Cir. 1974) (modifying the FDA’s classification of high-dosage vitamin
products as drugs, because manufacturer had not intended them for therapeutic use); Action on
Smoking and Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 239 (D.C. Cir 1980) (upholding the FDA’s refusal
to regulate cigarettes, because manufacturers had not represented product as “intended to affect the structure or any function of the body”). But see Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F.
Supp. 1374, 1389 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (upholding FDA jurisdiction over cigarettes, and determining a product’s “intended use” by evidence other than manufacturer representations).
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have beneficial effects on the human body. This practice is entirely
compatible with the legislative history and the contextual understanding of “drug” because a product is so characterized if it is used
with the suggestion that it will have some kind of desirable effect on
the body. This general idea also fits extremely well with the FDA’s
governing regulations.136
More particularly, the FDA’s practice with respect to tobacco
products has been entirely consistent with this understanding. The
FDA did regulate cigarettes in the past. When it did so, though, it invoked a specific ground, pointing to various manufacturers’ claims
about the beneficial effects of smoking, including its usefulness in
helping people to lose weight.137 In such cases, cigarettes were intended to affect the structure or function of the body in the same
sense as a “slenderizer” or the hypothesized “preposterous” chiropractic table.138 With both the slenderizer and the table, the product
was regulable to the extent that it was sold on the ground that it
would have the stated desirable physical effects. The key past federal
court of appeals case involving tobacco products endorsed this basic
understanding: “In cases such as the one at hand, consumers must use
the product predominantly, and in fact nearly exclusively with the
appropriate intent before the requisite statutory intent can be inferred.”139
How does this bear on the FDA’s current assertion of jurisdiction over tobacco? Note that in its jurisdictional statements, the FDA
emphasized that tobacco has various addictive and toxic properties,
and these factual claims are not in serious dispute.140 In order, how-

136. FDA regulations use the same language to explain the meaning of “intended uses” for
both drugs and devices. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.128 (1997) (drugs); id. § 801.4 (devices). While
both regulations state that this term “refer[s] to the objective intent of the persons legally responsible for the labeling of [the drugs or devices, respectively],” this intent may be shown either explicitly “by such persons’ expressions” or may be inferred “by the circumstances surrounding the use of the article.” Id. §§ 201.128, 801.4 (1997). Specifically, “[i]t may be shown by
the circumstances that the article is, with the knowledge of such persons or their representatives, offered and used for a purpose for which it is neither labeled nor advertised.” Id. Thus, a
product not explicitly sold as a fat reducer may be implicitly understood in this way, and the
manufacturers’ intention that it be so understood and used would be sufficient. Tobacco is very
different because tobacco is not used on the understanding that it would produce addiction.
137. See United States v. 354 Bulk Cartons . . . Trim Reducing-Aid Cigarettes, 178 F. Supp.
847 (D.N.J. 1959); United States v. 46 Cartons . . . Fairfax Cigarettes, 113 F. Supp. 336 (D.N.J.
1953).
138. See supra notes 130-132.
139. Action on Smoking and Health, 655 F.2d at 240.
140. See, e.g., Jurisdictional Determination, supra note 86, at 44,634 (describing “[t]he sci-
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ever, to fit tobacco products within the statutory definition of “drug,”
this is insufficient (on the interpretation I am now offering). Manufacturers must sell tobacco with some reference to those addictive
and toxic properties; they must, in other words, sell tobacco by, in
some sense, invoking or stressing those properties. It is this kind of
sale that would make tobacco into a “drug.” This, of course, they
have not done (and needless to say this would be a self-defeating
strategy).
In a nutshell, this argument runs, the fact that tobacco does affect the structure or function of the body and that tobacco companies
“intend” this effect is not decisive. While a literalist interpretation is
a linguistically plausible reading of the statute, it wrenches the word
“drug” out of its context and turns the statute into a basis for regulating anything at all that (knowingly) affects the bodies of human
beings or animals. Perhaps the statutory terms should be understood
in their context, which involves the regulation of drugs, and should be
defined in a way that is consistent with that context. It would not be
at all difficult to imagine an opinion rejecting FDA authority over
tobacco on the basis of an analysis of this kind.
This, then, is the conflict raised by the FDA’s assertion of
authority over tobacco. On the one hand, the ordinary meaning of
the statutory terms plainly supports the FDA. On the other hand, the
best understanding of the statutory terms, taken in their context,
plausibly argues against the FDA’s interpretation. It is easy to imagine reasonable opinions both ways. Moreover, democratic considerations might themselves be marshaled in both directions. The FDA is,
of course, subject to democratic influences, and its assertion of jurisdiction over tobacco is closely connected to perceived judgments
from the electorate and to the values of the President, who has taken
a strong personal interest in the regulation of tobacco products. On
the other hand, it might be said that a statute designed to regulate
drugs ought not be understood to authorize FDA control of tobacco
and tobacco products unless and until Congress, the most representative institution in the federal government and the constitutionally
designated lawmaker, has made that specific decision.

entific consensus that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco cause addiction to nicotine”).
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D. Purpose
The contextual understanding of the FDCA offers a distinctive
interpretation of the Act’s purpose, one that competes with the
broader argument, based on information failure, that was offered
above. On this view, Congress was concerned, first and foremost,
with ensuring that the FDA had authority over products billed as
medicines or as otherwise therapeutic,141 where the likelihood of
fraud, deception, confusion, and harm is especially high, as are the
stakes. But Congress was also concerned with the kind of fraud and
deception that comes when products are marketed as affecting the
body in a beneficial way,142 because this kind of misrepresentation,
whether or not based on explicit language, is in the same family of
harmfulness as the core or defining case.
On this view, Congress did not give the FDA a roving authority
to regulate all products that have effects on the human body, when
those effects are known and desired. The statute’s goal—to permit
controls on medical, therapeutic, or other similar products—was far
narrower than that.
IV. RESOLUTIONS
It thus emerges that there are two competing understandings of
the relevant provision of the FDCA, with different assessments of the
language and of the underlying purpose of the Act. In a familiar formulation, a court might resolve the dispute by asking which is a better constructive interpretation, that is, by asking which interpretation
best fits the relevant statutory materials and which interpretation
makes best sense of those materials.143 In a conflict of this kind, there
are several natural places to look for assistance. I discuss several possible strategies for resolving the case: analogies, diverse tie breakers,
and a narrow argument by the FDA that attempts to draw on the
contextual interpretation described above. I ultimately conclude that

141. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(A)-(B) (1994) (“(A) articles recognized in the official
United States Pharmacopoeia, official Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or
official National Formulary, or any supplement to any of them; and (B) articles intended for
use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals”).
142. See id. § 321(g)(1)(C) (“articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or
any function of the body of man or other animals”).
143. For an illuminating discussion of “constructive” statutory interpretation, see RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 313-54 (1986).
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the narrow argument, combined with an understanding of the common law role of modern agencies, is sufficient to support the FDA’s
assertion of jurisdiction.
A. Analogies
In one form or another, the conflict under discussion comes up
in many areas. Consider, for example, McDoyle v. United States,144 an
important case in the law of statutory construction. The issue in
McDoyle involved the meaning of the statutory term “motor vehicle,” defined as including “an automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon, motorcycle, or any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails.”145 The relevant statute made it a federal
crime to transport a motor vehicle, thus defined, known by the transporter to be stolen.146 The question in the case was simple: did an airplane qualify as a “motor vehicle”? In one sense, the answer would
seem to be yes, since an airplane is a self-propelled vehicle emphatically not designed for running on rails. In an opinion by Justice Holmes, the Court acknowledged that it was possible to understand an
airplane to be a vehicle, but concluded that in its context the term
had a narrower scope:
When a rule of conduct is laid down in words that evoke in the
common mind only the picture of vehicles moving on land, the statute should not be extended to aircraft, simply because it may seem
to us that a similar policy applies, or upon the speculation that, if the
legislature had thought of it, very likely broader words would have
147
been used.

Thus, Justice Holmes suggested that a statutory term would be understood by reference to exemplar cases and, in particular, to the
“picture” that is “evoked in the common mind.”148 Perhaps this idea
supports the attack on the FDA regulation, suggesting that despite
the literal language of the FDCA, tobacco is simply too far afield
from the “picture” called up by the contextual understanding of the
term “drug.”

144. 283 U.S. 25 (1931).
145. Id. at 26 (construing the National Motor Vehicle Theft (Dyer) Act, ch. 89, 41 Stat. 324
(1919) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1994))).
146. See id.
147. Id. at 27.
148. Id.
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Consider two more recent cases: the famous affirmative action
decision United Steelworkers of America v. Weber149 and the less famous but very similar interpretive problem in Smith v. United
150
States.
In Weber, the Court held that a statutory ban on
“discrimination” did not forbid a voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action program.151 The Court understood “discrimination” in a
highly contextual manner. It concluded that despite its literal
breadth, the term should not be wrenched out of context to forbid
conduct that Congress had not chosen to forbid.152 The Court rejected
what it saw as an excessively literal and insufficiently purposive
reading of the statute. Justice Rehnquist wrote a vigorous dissenting
opinion, contending, among other things, that the word
“discrimination” should be interpreted in its ordinary English
sense.153 Whether or not Weber was correctly decided, the basic approach was far from exotic, and it provided a possible foundation on
which to build an outcome unfavorable to the FDA in the tobacco
litigation.
In Smith, the Court was asked to decide whether a statutory ban
on the “use” of a firearm in connection with a drug offense applied to
the “use” of a firearm as an object of barter.154 Invoking the literal
meaning of the word “use” and the dictionary, the Court held that
the statutory ban did indeed apply.155 Justice Scalia wrote a vigorous
dissenting opinion, arguing that while trading a firearm could be understood as a use, the statutory context suggested that the term was
best understood to mean “used as a firearm,” not as a commodity.156
Weber suggests the important point stressed by Justice Holmes:
that language is often understood by reference to the paradigm or
exemplar cases that it was written in order to cover. In Weber, the
Court might be taken to have said that the 1964 Civil Rights Act was
designed to forbid discrimination against blacks—that this was the
paradigm or exemplar case—and that the literal meaning of the word
“discrimination” would not be taken out of its context in order to re149. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
150. 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
151. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
152. See id. at 201.
153. See id. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
154. See Smith, 508 U.S. at 225.
155. See id. at 228-29, 241.
156. See id. at 241-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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solve a question to which Congress had given little or no attention. In
Smith, Justice Scalia’s approach was similar. The paradigm case involved the use of a gun as a firearm, and the word “use” should be
understood in the setting in which it was written, which included, not
incidentally, a substantial mandatory minimum sentence.157 While it
would take a lengthy argument to establish this claim, I believe that
Weber was correctly decided and that Smith was wrong. The basic
reason is that when there is ambiguity, a statute generally should not
be taken to extend to a case that Congress did not consider, at least if
there is an arguable difference between that case and the exemplar
cases covered by the rule. Congress should not be taken to have
made certain acts unlawful if it has had no occasion to focus on those
particular acts.158
A judgment of this kind might well suggest that the FDA has no
authority to regulate tobacco, on the theory that the contextual understanding of “drug” suggests a narrower definition, and that Congress should not be taken to have authorized the FDA to undertake
such regulation by a kind of inadvertence. There are, however, two
crucial differences between the FDA case on the one hand and Weber and Smith on the other. First, the definition of “drug” offers far
stronger support for the FDA than did the terms “discrimination”159
and “use” for Weber and Smith. In this respect, the best precedent for
the FDA may be Oncale, holding, on the basis of text, that the ban on
sex discrimination applies to same-sex harassment, even though that
problem was far from the specific intention of the passing Congress.160
Second, an administrative agency entrusted with rulemaking authority is involved in the FDA case, whereas it was not in the latter two.
The strongest argument on behalf of the FDA emphasizes this point,
as we will shortly see.

157. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994) (providing that “[w]hoever, during and in relation to
any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to
the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to
imprisonment for five years”).
158. I argue these points in some detail in CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND
POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996).
159. The majority wrote as if this word supported Weber. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979). In my view, this was a mistake, for that word is highly ambiguous
in the context of a civil rights act. An ordinary English speaker might well conclude, without
revealing his ignorance of English, that affirmative action programs are not a form of
“discrimination” on the basis of race.
160. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998).
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An interesting analogy in this regard is Brogan v. United States.161
There the Court was asked to construe a federal perjury statute providing that “[w]hoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully . . . makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations . . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.”162 Lower courts had, since 1962, found
an exception to this prohibition when the defendant issued a simple
denial of guilt: the “exculpatory no.”163 The lower courts reasoned
that an “exculpatory no” was far afield from Congress’s purposes in
enacting the statute.164 The statute had originally been enacted as part
of the prohibition on filing fraudulent claims with the government,
and the ban on false statements was limited to statements that related
to these filings.165 In 1918 the statute was broadened to apply to other
false statements designed to swindle or defraud the government, and
in 1934 it was broadened to its present form, apparently with the goal
of protecting the government “‘from the affirmative, aggressive, and
voluntary actions of persons who take the initiative.’”166 In this way,
the statute was designed to prevent the perversion of governmental
functions through affirmative lies, not to allow the government to
convert protected acts into crimes by obtaining “no” answers to incriminating questions.
In Brogan, the Court rejected a purposive understanding of the
statute: “[I]t is not, and cannot be, our practice to restrict the unqualified language of a statute to the particular evil that Congress
was trying to remedy.”167 In so saying, the Court found it irrelevant
that courts had been interpreting the statute to exempt the
“exculpatory no” for well over thirty years. Brogan thus suggests an
interpretive method that strongly favors the FDA. On the other
hand, the text of the false statements statute in Brogan was clear, and
at most created a problem of excessive generality, as in Wittgenstein’s famous “gaming with dice” example;168 the FDCA has greater

161. 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998).
162. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988) (amended 1996).
163. See Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 808.
164. See id.
165. See id. at 813 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
166. Id. at 814 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d
298, 302 (5th. Cir. 1962)).
167. Id. at 809.
168. “Someone says to me: ‘Shew the children a game.’ I teach them gaming with dice, and
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ambiguity, and the case for a contextual limitation on its reach is
therefore stronger. Oncale is closer to the tobacco case on this count.
I conclude that the analogous cases do not favor one result or the
other. In some cases, literal language has been understood literally; in
others, courts have proceeded more purposively and contextually. Of
course, literalism is rejected when it would produce absurd results.169
Of course, purpose and context is considered when the language is
ambiguous. But when the language seems to support an agency’s
view, and when the context raises doubt, there is no clear line of
authority.
B. Of Stare Decisis, Legislative Acquiescence, and Comprehensive
Deals
Perhaps the tiebreaker lies in subsequent developments. Indeed,
the tiebreaker may be more than that.
For the past several decades, the FDA has consistently disavowed authority over tobacco,170 and Congress has refused to enact
legislation that would give FDA this authority.171 Congress has repeatedly been presented with such legislation, and it has gone nowhere. Perhaps Congress can be said to have acquiesced in, or ratified, the FDA’s previous interpretation. Some cases find a kind of
acquiescence in similar circumstances.172 For the FDA, though, things
are worse than that. Congress has not merely refused to act; it has
also enacted a great deal of legislation against the backdrop set by
the other says ‘I didn’t mean that sort of game.’ Must the exclusion of the game with dice have
come before his mind when he gave me the order?” LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS 33 n.68 (1968).
169. See Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 189-90 (N.Y. 1889) (holding that equity and public
policy dictate that one who murders the testator to receive an inheritance shall not be entitled
to that inheritance although a literal statutory reading dictates otherwise).
170. See Hearings on S. 1454, supra note 54, at 239-42 (statement of Dr. Charles Edwards,
Comm’r, FDA) (asserting that FDA jurisdiction over cigarettes would be inconsistent with
clear congressional intent); Susan H. Carchman, Should the FDA Regulate Nicotine-Containing
Cigarettes?, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 85, 121 n.281 (1996) (citing a 1980 letter from FDA Commissioner Goyan, which asserted that Congress was aware that the FDA disavowed jurisdiction
over cigarettes); see also supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
171. See H.R. 11280, 84th Cong. (1956); H.R. 5973, 88th Cong. (1963); S. 1682, 88th Cong.
(1963); H.R. 2248, 89th Cong. (1965).
172. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600-02 (1983) (using congressional
inaction on bills regarding the tax status of discriminatory private schools as support for conclusion that Congress acquiesced in IRS rulings); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,
474 U.S. 121, 137 (1985) (holding that Congress’s refusal to overrule an agency’s construction
of legislation provides some evidence of the reasonableness of that construction).
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the FDA’s claim that it cannot exercise authority over tobacco as a
drug. Examples are the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act of 1965,173 the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986,174 and the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health
Reorganization Act of 1992.175 The basic functions of this legislation
are to control tobacco advertising and to ensure disclosure of health
information, functions that overlap with some of the FDA’s recent
requirements. Even if the case were otherwise in equipoise, one
might argue, the background of a consistent FDA interpretation, at
least when combined with actual congressional enactments that might
well coexist uneasily with FDA action, is sufficient to resolve the case
against the FDA.
It is therefore possible to imagine an opinion that would
strengthen the contextual understanding of the statutory terms with
the observation that the FDA has long understood the Act not to apply to tobacco. Such an opinion would emphasize that Congress has
legislated with the understanding that the FDA lacks that authority.
The result is a system of regulation that reflects Congress’s considered judgments—a system which would be rendered nonsensical by
allowing two layers of controls, both statutory and administrative.176
Indeed, such an opinion need not rely on the contextual understanding at all. The argument could simply be that the longstanding FDA
opinion was part of a settlement that produced substantial legislation
and that the FDA cannot suddenly change its mind and interfere with
the congressionally chosen enforcement scheme.
This is a reasonable argument, but it has several problems. First,
the FDA’s position was not unambiguous. The FDA did not disclaim
all authority over tobacco. It said that it would not exercise its
authority unless tobacco companies made representations of physical

173. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340
(1994)) (requiring a health-related warning label on all cigarette packaging and advertising).
174. Pub. L. No. 99-252, 100 Stat. 30 (1986) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408 (1994))
(requiring warning labels and ingredient disclosure on smokeless tobacco products and establishing a public health education program to increase risk awareness).
175. Pub. L. No. 102-321, § 202, 106 Stat. 323, 394-95 (1992) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300x26 (1994)) (requiring states to prohibit the sale of tobacco products to individuals under eighteen in order to receive federal mental health funds under the act).
176. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 128 (1958) (requiring consistency over time in the
breadth of the exercise of the Secretary of State’s discretionary power to issue passports); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41-42 (1983) (holding
that the rescission or modification of administrative rules is subject to the same procedures as
their promulgation under the Administrative Procedure Act).
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effects of some kind.177 The FDA’s current assertion of authority over
tobacco is based largely on a claim that tobacco companies made, and
intended to make, that kind of representation.178 No doubt this was a
change in the FDA’s position, but there was some ambiguity in the
former disclaimer of authority, and there is something less than complete discontinuity between the FDA’s past and current positions.
Second, the idea of ratification or acquiescence is strongest when
legitimate reliance interests have been built up around the previous
view. If, for example, private actors have ordered their affairs on a
certain understanding of the law, then a change in that understanding
could defeat legitimate expectations. And while tobacco companies
have assumed that the FDA would not be regulating them, the landscape of regulation of the world of cigarette smoking has been shifting rapidly (to say the least), and it would be extravagant to suggest
that the assertion of FDA authority would defeat reasonable expectations.
Third, agencies are, with respect to stare decisis, in a very different position from courts. Agencies are permitted to change their
minds, especially under the Supreme Court’s decision in the Chevron
case,179 on which more is said below. It is one thing to say that judicial
interpretations can be “frozen” by legislative inaction that might be
taken to represent acquiescence in the judicial judgments; this idea is
part of a strong principle of stare decisis for statutory meaning, designed to limit judicial discretion.180 But agencies are in a different position, and when the change in view is associated with changed understandings of legally relevant facts, there is no problem with that
change. Indeed, such changes in view, even when they alter the interpretation of a statute, are perfectly acceptable when motivated by
judgements about values, as Chevron itself makes entirely clear.181
There, too, the agency changed its interpretation, and there, too, the
177. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
178. See Jurisdictional Analysis, supra note 5, at 41,522; Jurisdictional Determination, supra
note 82, at 44,690-806, 44,847-45,097, 45,171-78.
179. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Chevron is discussed in greater detail infra in the text accompanying notes 209-221.
180. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 517-20 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Judicial Deference]; David M. Gossett, Comment, Chevron, Take Two: Deference to Revised Agency Interpretation of Statutes, 64 U. CHI. L.
REV. 681, 688, 701 (1997).
181. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 857-58, 863-64 (reaffirming deference to an agency “primarily
responsible for administering” legislation, where the agency has reasonably interpreted the
legislation).
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interpretation was made public, and Congress could easily have been
made aware of it.182 Here the FDA’s change was self-consciously motivated by new understandings of the effects of tobacco and of tobacco companies’ intentions with respect to those effects.
These points would not be controlling if Congress had endorsed
or ratified the FDA’s prior position. How might any such ratification
have come about? There are two separate possibilities: Congress may
have ratified the FDA’s view by failing to enact proposed legislation
that would overturn it,183 or Congress may have ratified the FDA’s
view by enacting legislation that was preemptive or comprehensive,
in the sense that it reflected a settlement of the question of tobacco
regulation, a settlement of which the absence of FDA authority was a
part. Let us examine these points in order.
To say the least, there are many complexities in drawing inferences from the mere fact that Congress debated whether to regulate
tobacco in certain ways, with the apparent understanding that the
FDA would not be involved. Some cases have found a kind of
“acquiescence” in longstanding interpretations; they suggest that a
settled pattern of agency interpretations, which Congress considered
overruling but did not overrule, is relevant to judicial interpretation.184 This approach is especially reasonable where there has been
detrimental reliance on the previous interpretation. But other cases
point in the opposite direction.185 Certainly Congress does not legislate by failing to legislate.186 The failure to enact certain bills involving
tobacco, by itself, does not divest the FDA of authority that it would
otherwise have. There is little authority, and properly so, for the
proposition that congressional acquiescence in administrative interpretations, in the form of inaction, works to bind an agency to those
interpretations. Nor is this a case in which the FDCA has been reenacted against the background set by the FDA’s interpretation.187 A
claim of acquiescence is especially weak in a case in which there have
182. See id. at 857-59.
183. Examples of such refusals are listed above in note 171.
184. See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374, 1381-83 (M.D.N.C. 1997)
(discussing this theory and listing cases in which this argument was made).
185. See id. at 1382-83 (citing Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 187
(1994)); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 45 (1983)).
186. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 187 (“[F]ailed legislative proposals are a particularly
dangerous ground on which to rest an interpretation of a prior statute.”).
187. See ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 243-44, 311-12 (listing
Supreme Court decisions applying the reenactment rule finding ratification). But see id. at 312
(discussing Supreme Court decisions applying the reenactment rule finding no ratification).
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been new understandings of statutorily relevant facts; the FDA did
not disclaim all authority over tobacco for all time, and hence it is not
even clear that a reenactment would have frozen the preexisting
FDA view.
Subsequent legislation on the general topic is the strongest basis
for holding against the FDA. If the legislation could be treated as a
comprehensive settlement, and if an absence of FDA authority was a
part of that settlement, then the new regulation would be invalid. But
this would be an extravagant inference from what Congress has actually done. The preemption provision in the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1986, for example, is quite narrow,188 and
the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act reads
in similar terms.189 Hence, the relevant legislation should not by itself
eliminate FDA authority, even if that legislation was enacted with
the understanding that the FDA would not regulate tobacco. The
strongest argument from subsequent legislation would rest on an actual conflict between the legislation and FDA regulations; to the extent that there is such a conflict, the regulations are preempted. At
the very least, though, most of what the FDA has done can coexist
comfortably with the relevant statutes, and hence the most that can
be said is that some of the FDA regulations might be subject to challenge as applied. Repeals by implication are disfavored,190 and the

188. It provides that “[n]o statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required by section 1333 of this title, shall be required on any cigarette package.” 15
U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1994).
189. “No statement relating to the use of smokeless tobacco products and health, other than
the statements required by section 4402 of this title, shall be required by any Federal agency to
appear on any package or in any advertisement . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 4406(a) (1994). Note also that
a recent act, which requires that a state must prohibit the sale of tobacco products to individuals under eighteen in order to receive federal funding under the act, includes federal funding
and does not preempt FDA regulatory authority. See Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health
Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 102-321, § 202, 106 Stat. 323, 394-95 (1992) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 300x-26 (1994)). This point is fortified by a 1997 enactment suggesting that FDA
authority is unsettled. The Food and Drug Administration Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, §
422, 111 Stat. 2296, 2380 (codified at 21 U.S.C.A. § 321 note (West Supp. 1998)), provides that:
Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to affect
the question of whether the Secretary of Health and Human Services has any
authority to regulate any tobacco product, tobacco ingredient, or tobacco additive.
Such authority, if any, shall be exercised under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) as in effect on the day before the date of the
enactment this Act [Nov. 21, 1997].
190. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189-90 (1978) (stating that repeals by
implication are disfavored and are only permissible when earlier and later statutes cannot be
reconciled).
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claim that the FDA has been divested of authority by subsequent
legislation looks very similar to a claim for implied repeal.
I conclude that the subsequent legislation makes for a plausible
argument against the FDA. But outside of the context of a direct conflict, that plausible argument is not convincing.
C. Pragmatic Considerations: Legislative Responsiveness and Judicial
Capacity
A natural way to resolve the dispute between a more literal and
more contextual understanding is to ask some questions about institutional capacity. First, which approach would lead to more mistakes
and more serious mistakes? This is a question about “error costs.”
Second, which approach would lead to more costly and more difficult
decisions? This is a question about “decision costs.”
To approach these questions, it is necessary to refine the distinction between the two approaches; they represent a continuum rather
than a sharp dichotomy. Some literal interpretations would be ruled
out by context, regardless of one’s general approach. This is true not
only for scrivener’s errors,191 but also for terms whose meaning becomes plain only by context.192 Context is always present and always
helps inform the understanding of meaning. In some cases the literal
meaning would make no sense; even the most enthusiastic textualists
accept this point.193 By the same token, contextual interpretation becomes quite contentious if it is understood to entail a rejection of the
plain meaning of the text on the basis of the legislative history. The
form of contextualism that argues against the FDA is more modest: it
is merely a suggestion that an apparently broad text should be understood by reference to its purpose and background and that the context, including the history, supports a narrower understanding than
the language alone suggests. The debate here is not between rigid lit-

191. These are to be fixed via contextual interpretation. See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION,
supra note 107, at 20-21.
192. Consider, for example, the term “use” in Smith. See supra notes 154-156 and accompanying text.
193. Justice Scalia, for example, a self-described textualist, acknowledges that context is a
critical tool to be used in interpreting the meaning of a word. See Smith v. United States, 508
U.S. 223, 241-47 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s literal definition of
the word “use” is inaccurate given its ordinary contextual meaning); see also SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 102, at 23-24 (criticizing the majority’s strict construction in Smith
and stating that a text should be interpreted “reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means,” a
goal which neither strict nor lenient construction achieves).
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eralists and text-rejecting contextualists—two pretty absurd camps—
but between two emphatically reasonable opponents: those who
would stress the ordinary meaning of the statutory terms and those
who would stress contextual factors suggesting a narrower view than
the words alone support.
In ordinary communication, of course, literal interpretation is infrequent, and likely unsuccessful: “don’t leave the house” (but what if
there is a fire?); “let’s play a game, any game you like” (but what if
Russian roulette is proposed?). In ordinary communication, people
understand words very much in context, with reference to presumed
intentions. Genuine “literalism” is a province of androids and robots
in science fiction, who do not really understand how language works,
and of eight-year-old children, who derive considerable humor and
mischief from literal interpretation.194 The point suggests a pervasive
problem with literalism: it may generate mistakes, in the form of inaccurate understandings of Congress’s instructions. We can talk all
we like of the difficulty of discovering the “intention” of a multimember decisionmaking body; the point still holds.
Thus, the defense of a contextual understanding depends on the
view that it is likely to produce more accurate interpretations, where
accuracy is assessed by reference to Congress’s judgments about what
it is seeking to accomplish.195 On this view, an emphasis on context is
part of any approach to interpretation that seeks to elicit actual
judgments and understandings. Contextual interpretation is thus
analogous to “market-mimicking” or “intention-eliciting” default
rules in the law of contract.196 In contract law, as in statutory interpretation, default rules and interpretive strategies might be intended to
figure out what the parties are likely to have wanted to have done.
Indeed, it would be possible to conclude that all understanding is
contextual and that literalism, in the tobacco case or anywhere else, is
obtuse, something to be used only when there is reason to think that
the literal interpretation has a good claim to being the contextual one
too.

194. Personal experience confirms this point!
195. Justice Scalia, importantly, is not a literalist; he counsels attention to context. See
SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 107, at 37 (“In textual interpretation, context is everything, and the context of the Constitution tells us not to expect nit-picking detail, and to give
words and phrases an expansive rather than narrow interpretation—though not an interpretation that the language will not bear.”).
196. See generally Ayres & Gertner, supra note 14 (discussing various possible default rules
in the law of contracts).
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But this view is far too simple.197 Suppose, for example, that the
more contextual interpretation depends on resort to the legislative
history, and that the statute’s text alone, as enacted in 1938, cannot
support that interpretation. It is entirely reasonable to think that the
text should prevail. A refusal to give the words their ordinary meaning may create bad incentives for Congress; perhaps a more literal
reading would encourage Congress to speak more clearly. A literal
reading may also greatly simplify the process of judicial judgment.
Freed from reliance on the ordinary meaning of the text, contextualist courts might produce mistakes, partly through simple error, partly
through willfulness, even if some contextualist courts might also
make some better decisions than literalist ones. In other words, literalists cannot be perfect; but perhaps they will be better, on balance,
than their adversaries. Here as elsewhere, the perfect can be the enemy of the good. On this view, (reasonable, rather than science fictional) literalism can be justified as analogous to an informationeliciting rule in the law of contract, designed to force the parties (or
in this case, the Congress) to speak with greater clarity.198 It can be so
justified with the additional claim that if intention-eliciting is important, literalism is no worse than the alternative, and perhaps better, at
least as a general rule.199
It is hard to resolve this dispute in the abstract. An obvious question is whether Congress will in fact respond to literal interpretations
by legislating with greater care and clarity; there is little evidence that
it will. Another question is whether Congress will respond to judicial
mistakes, and here there is no systematic evidence. These points suggest that the contextual approach is more reasonable, at least where
the court is confident that the resulting interpretation is really a fairly
accurate conception of Congress’s instructions and where the notion
of contextual interpretation is not a guise for unreliable inferences
based on legislative history.
This conclusion suggests that if the courts were deciding the issue in the first instance, tobacco products could not be regulated
without a convincing showing that they were being sold with some
197. See SCHAUER, supra note 11, at 196-200 (defending formalism).
198. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 14, at 104 (arguing that courts should choose clear
rules which “promote information revelation”).
199. See Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The
Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833 (1998) (criticizing intentionalist
courts’ use of legislative history in statutory interpretation cases based upon their inability to
cope with the volume and heterogeneity of prior statutes).
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kind of representation about their beneficial medical or therapeutic
effects, making them analogous to slenderizers.200 But courts are not
deciding this issue in the first instance—an important fact of life in
the administrative state,201 as we shall soon see.
D. A Narrower Reading by the FDA?
Is it possible to accept the contextual interpretation offered in
Part III while, at the same time, upholding the FDA’s treatment of
cigarettes as drugs? Might the FDA endorse a narrower understanding of the statute and still prevail? This would be the most promising
route; it would make the basic conflict about styles of interpretation
irrelevant, or nearly so.
To the extent that the FDA is emphasizing the addictive properties of tobacco, this question is hard to answer affirmatively. If tobacco companies urged that smoking helps to prevent colds, cigarettes would fit within the contextual meaning of the term “use.” But
addiction is altogether different, since no one contends that tobacco
companies successfully encouraged people to smoke on the ground
that smokers would become addicts. Things are, however, a bit more
complicated for those challenging the FDA regulation. In its ruling,
the FDA referred not only to addiction but also to two other undisputed changes that tobacco produces in the function of the body: the
effects of smoking in producing both tranquillity and stimulation and
the effects of smoking in producing weight control.202 There can be no
question that the FDA would have the power to treat tobacco products as drugs if they were sold with the representation, express or implied, that they help people to control weight. Nor can there be much
doubt that the FDA would be authorized to treat tobacco as a drug if
it were sold as a method for producing stimulation or tranquillity.
Could the FDA find that these effects were intended by manufacturers and understood by consumers, so that cigarettes would be akin to
slenderizers after all? A reading of the rationale in support of the
regulations suggests that the FDA did make this finding.
This is far from a frivolous argument. Many people use cigarettes
because of their effects on the functions of the body—usually for
producing either stimulation or tranquillity, sometimes for helping to

200.
201.
202.

See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.
See Jurisdictional Determination, supra note 86, at 44,666.
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prevent weight gain. A reasonable person could find that manufacturers intend these effects and that many consumers smoke with
these effects in mind. Indeed, common advertisements for cigarettes
can be seen to be emphasizing, explicitly or implicitly, the tranquilizing and stimulating effects of smoking,203 and there is evidence that
tobacco companies have been entirely aware of these effects.204 Thus,
for example, the FDA reported survey evidence that over seventy
percent of young people who are daily smokers said that they smoked
for relaxation.205 The narrowest decision upholding FDA authority
would emphasize these points, which provide a much stronger foundation for the FDA’s assertion of jurisdiction than does addiction.206
V. AGENCIES AS COMMON LAW COURTS
A. A Reading of Chevron
Thus far the discussion has proceeded as if this were a case of
statutory interpretation, but it is also one of administrative law, and
the FDA’s position is much fortified if we expand the lens in this way.
In the modern era, most of the key work of statutory interpretation
is, of course, not done by courts, but rather by federal agencies. Most
of these interpretive acts never face judicial review, and those who
challenge such acts face a high burden.207 Realistically speaking, general and ambiguous terms are given their meaning by agency officials
who adapt those terms to changing facts and values. Thus, the business of a wide range of agencies—the NLRB, the FCC, the FTC, the
SEC, the IRS, the EPA, the CPSC, and many more—involves the
specification of general statutory terms, the resolution of ambiguities,

203. See, e.g., KLUGER, supra note 63, at 295, 443-45 (noting especially that the Marlboro
Man is capable of both ‘action’ and ‘repose,’ suggesting both stimulation and tranquillity);
Irene Scharf, Breathe Deeply: The Tort of Smokers’ Battery, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 615, 631-60
(1995) (discussing advertising thoroughly, and noting specific campaigns based on the weight
control properties of cigarettes).
204. See Jurisdictional Determination, supra note 86, at 44,668-69.
205. See id. at 44,814.
206. The narrow argument I am endorsing here does not rely on the addictive properties of
tobacco, because reliance on those properties stretches the contextual meaning of the statute
further than does an interpretation that relies on tobacco’s sedating and stimulating properties.
207. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-45 (1984) (requiring “deference to administrative interpretations”).
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and the adaptation of legal texts (their enabling statutes) to new circumstances and new social understandings.208
The point is, of course, recognized in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., which, it is becoming increasingly clear, stands as the most important case about legal interpretation in the last thirty years.209 Chevron holds that where statutes
are ambiguous, courts should accept any reasonable interpretation by
the agency charged with their implementation.210 Agencies are to prevail whenever statutes are subject to diverse, plausible readings. This
idea is of course strongly supportive of the FDA’s position that tobacco can be treated as a drug.
The central idea behind Chevron is that where underlying statutes are ambiguous, Congress should be taken to have decided that
agencies are in a better position to make judgments about their
meaning than are courts.211 Agencies are in that better position because, Chevron emphasizes, the President is generally in charge of
their policy judgments, and hence agencies have a kind of democratic
pedigree, certainly a better one than the courts.212 Administrative
208. See infra notes 229-233 and accompanying text.
209. There is, of course, much debate about the precise meaning and consequences of the
decision. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 351 (1994) (discussing implications for textualism); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial
Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992) (arguing that the Supreme Court
has not rigorously followed Chevron); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron
Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984 (presenting
empirical evidence about the impact of Chevron on administrative law).
210. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45. This statement simplifies some complex issues. For
more comprehensive discussions, see 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE & KENNETH CULP DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 3.1-3.7 (1994 & Supp. 1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and
Administration after Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (1990) [hereinafter Sunstein, Law and
Administration].
211. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (discussing “implicit” delegation of power to
“elucidate” statutes). Although not on the Chevron Court, Justice Scalia argues that Chevron is
best taken to hold that the question of deference will be resolved by reference to Congress’s
instructions. Of course, when Congress passes an ambiguous statute, it fails to give clear instructions. Thus, both in light of the value of providing a clear background rule and because
Chevron is a reasonable understanding of Congress’s views about relevant institutional capacities, statutes will generally be read to require courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of law. See Scalia, Judicial Deference, supra note 180, at 516.
212. In the Court’s words:
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is,
and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make
such policy choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency
charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66. In some ways, perhaps, agencies have a stronger democratic pedi-
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agencies are, of course, influenced by shifting public judgments, and
their approaches are likely to reflect the President’s basic commitments.213 This was, no doubt, true in Chevron itself, where the costsaving innovation there at issue responded to President Reagan’s
concern with expensive regulations. In the context of the tobacco
controversy, the point is highly relevant, for there can be little doubt
that the FDA’s position is highly responsive to the views of President
Clinton, who has made regulation of tobacco a central issue, not least
in the context of the presidential campaign of 1996.214 Chevron appears in this way to accept the suggestion that deciding how to read
ambiguities in a law involves no brooding omnipresence in the sky
but an emphatically human judgment about policy or principle.215 This
suggestion was of course central to the legal realist movement, but it
is now supported by a wide range of people216 and it obviously bears
on the question of whether and how the FDA can interpret the word
“drug.”
Chevron also has a technocratic (as opposed to democratic) justification: judgments about the best meaning of statutory terms may
well turn on an understanding of underlying facts. A decision about
which articles affect the structure or function of the body will inevitably turn on judgments about facts, not only about the particular
consequences of using the relevant articles, but also on the consequences, for regulatory policy, of a judgment one way or the other.
This point is closely connected to the question of whether the FDA
has authority over tobacco, since the FDA’s decision turned partly on
judgments about the facts.217

gree than Congress itself, though the Chevron Court does not so argue. For an argument to this
effect, see JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 131-157 (1997).
213. See MASHAW, supra note 212, at 131-157.
214. See, e.g., Glenn Frankel, Decades After Declaration, War on Smoking Begins, WASH.
POST, Aug. 24, 1996, at A1 (discussing President Clinton’s support for the FDA’s assertion of
regulatory authority over tobacco and its relationship to the presidential campaign).
215. Chevron thus has much in common with Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938). Both cases involve a rejection of the view that federal courts could neutrally declare
“the law,” and both cases, following that rejection, reallocate legal authority from federal
courts to other institutions. For a provocative general discussion of the “Erie effect,” see Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive Theory, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1795-1801 (1997).
216. See DWORKIN, supra note 143, at 36-37. There is an interesting relation between
Dworkin and Chevron: both acknowledge the constructive aspects of interpretation, but Chevron sees this as a reason for administrative rather than judicial judgment.
217. Here, however, it seems mostly to be a political rather than technocratic judgment.
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In this and other disputes, the importance of the Chevron decision cannot be overstated: in its relatively short period on the scene,
218
Chevron, a kind of counter-Marbury for the administrative state,
has been cited more frequently than Marbury v. Madison, Brown v.
219
220
Board of Education, or Roe v. Wade, and, if present trends continue, it may ultimately be cited more frequently than all those cases
put together.221 Of course, there are limits to what citation rates show,
but, at the very least, Chevron has become the framework through
which agency interpretations of law are reviewed.
For present purposes, the basic point is that in establishing the
power of administrative agencies to resolve statutory ambiguities,
Chevron has recognized that the resolution of such ambiguities is
largely a judgment of policy, to be made by institutions with democratic accountability and technical expertise. In this way, Chevron has
granted agencies two important common law functions, those of
specifying statutory terms and of adapting those terms to new facts
and values. The question for post-Chevron law has involved the identification of limits on those common law functions.
B. Deference and Updating
We are thus left with the question of whether the FDA is bound
by what may appear to be the most reasonable interpretation of the
statutory terms, taken in their context and understood by reference
to the traditional tools of statutory construction, or whether the FDA
may adopt an interpretation that, whether or not the very best, seems
consistent with the language of the statute and that does not violate
any unambiguously expressed will of Congress. So phrased, Chevron
seems to supply the answer: the FDA should prevail.
The narrowest understanding of the FDA’s interpretation is that
when an article has a range of physical effects, including beneficial
effects, when the manufacturer intends those effects, and when a substantial number of consumers purchase the article because of those
effects, the article satisfies the definition of “drug.” It does not matter
that many consumers are unaware of or uninterested in those effects;

218. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
219. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
220. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
221. A Westlaw search (limited to federal cases) conducted on April 19, 1998 produced the
following results: Chevron, 6252 references; Marbury, 3818 references; Brown, 3455 references;
and Roe, 4885 references.
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the fact that many consumers are aware of them and smoke because
of them is sufficient if the manufacturer intends those effects. To uphold the FDA regulation, this narrow understanding is sufficient.
A large advantage of this route is that it does not threaten to
give rise to implausible hypotheticals. Indeed, it is hard to specify implausible outcomes that would follow from this understanding of
FDA authority or even from a somewhat more expansive understanding.222 Even a definition of exercise machines as drugs would,
under certain factual assumptions, fit well not merely with the statutory text but also with context, history, and longstanding practice.
It is possible to draw from this discussion a more general lesson,
which I can describe only briefly here. In the modern era, administrative agencies have become America’s common law courts. In the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, common law courts, of course,
had a kind of updating and particularizing function. In a common law
era, it was the job of common law judges to apply incompletely specified legal doctrines to new contexts and to supply new understandings of those doctrines, which were typically phrased as abstractions.
These new understandings sometimes amounted to reversals of preexisting doctrines, both general and particular. Often, judges
schooled in the common law tradition undertook a similar approach
to statutory terms, as in the great cases of Riggs v. Palmer223 and
224
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States. To some degree, courts
have exercised this common law function in the twentieth century as
well,225 but in a way that has been highly controversial. Some people
222. If the article in question is a food, it cannot count as a drug. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 321f-g
(1994) (“[A] food or dietary supplement . . . is not a drug . . . solely because the label or labeling contains . . . a statement [calling the food or dietary supplement a drug].”). Moreover, exercise machines and other “articles” that are marketed as having beneficial effects qualify as
drugs even under the narrower, more contextual understanding; hence, these do not count as
implausible hypotheticals. It should be noted that there simply are not many cases of articles
that are ingested, that do not count as foods, that have various effects on bodies, and that it
seems unreasonable to think that the FDA may treat as drugs. Note that a recent statute has
expressly exempted various dietary supplements. See Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-147, § 3, 108 Stat. 4325, 4327 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff )
(1994)).
223. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889) (rejecting a literal interpretation of a probate statute that
would allow a person’s murderer to receive an inheritance from that person).
224. 143 U.S. 457 (1892) (rejecting a literal interpretation of a statute when it was evident
that Congress did not intend the statute to be interpreted literally).
225. Consider, for example, a fairly conventional case, American Mining Congress v. EPA,
824 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Congress had not clearly dealt with the problem of how to handle materials held for recycling, and the relevant EPA regulation defined certain materials involved in recycling as “solid waste.” Id. at 1179. In particular, it said that spent materials,
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have urged that it is entirely illegitimate for judges to continue their
common law role,226 while others have argued for a form of
“dynamic” statutory interpretation,227 and still others have gone so far
as to urge a judicial power to nullify statutes on the ground that they
are out of accord with the existing legal landscape.228
In the modern period, however, dynamic interpretation is—
simply as a matter of actual practice—an administrative task, not a
judicial one. This is least controversially the case when agencies are
deciding how to apply general terms to new problems or old problems that appear in new lights. In the late twentieth century, administrative agencies have undertaken most of the functions of common
law courts, adapting general principles to various contexts, often in
ways that produce substantial reversals. This is an omnipresent feature of the modern legal landscape. Consider just a few examples.
The public interest standard for regulation of the broadcasting indussludges, scrap metal, and the like would be treated as solid waste if they were not directly reused but were instead held as part of an industry’s ongoing production process. See id. at 1180.
The EPA reasoned that materials that were stored, transported, and held for recycling were
associated with the same kinds of environmental harms as materials that were abandoned or
disposed of in some final way. The court of appeals struck down the EPA regulation on the
ground that the governing statute defined solid waste as “garbage, refuse, sludge . . . and other
discarded material,” id. at 1179. For the court, material held for recycling was not “discarded.”
Id. at 1193. Citing the dictionary, the court thought that the “ordinary, plain-English meaning”
was decisive. Id. at 1184. If the question was an internal dispute on a court of appeals about the
best interpretation of a statutory term, perhaps the majority would be right. But the question
involved the validity of an EPA regulation, produced after a complex process involving a number of political interests, an extended process of intergovernmental deliberation, and an elaborate inquiry into the underlying issues of substance. Even if a court would be reluctant to adapt
the meaning of a term like “discarded” to fit with context, is it not hubristic for judges, not
elected and knowing little about the enormously complex subject at hand, to invoke dictionaries (compiled, after all, by human beings) to invalidate executive branch decisions that cannot
reasonably be said to run afoul of any judgment made by Congress? The EPA’s decision followed a sustained period of public comment, and undoubtedly the government would be held
accountable for any decision about the reach of the enabling statute. If the EPA’s definitions
runs afoul of dictionary decisions but of no actual decision by Congress, should it really be
struck down? See also, e.g., Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448
U.S. 607, 659-62 (1980) (rejecting a literal interpretation of the OSH Act).
226. See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 107, at 12-14. Justice Scalia questions
“whether the attitude of the common law judge—the mindset that asks ‘what is the most desirable resolution of this case and how can any impediment to [its] achievement . . . be evaded?’—
is appropriate for the work that [he does] and much of the work that state judges do.” Id. at 13.
“All of this [judges interpreting the law in order to accomplish a goal] would be an unqualified
good, were it not for a trend in government in recent centuries, called democracy.” Id. at 9.
227. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 25, at 11 (defining “dynamic statutory interpretation” as the
divergence of the perspectives of the interpreter from that of the statute when written, often
because text takes on a new meaning due to subsequent social and ideological changes).
228. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 164 (1983).
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try has been subject to a common-law-like process of specification on
the part of the FCC, embodying recognition of new values and facts.
Thus, the FCC originally created and then eliminated the fairness
doctrine, and new public interest obligations have grown up in the
wake of the elimination.229 The EPA’s regulations for protecting the
public health through national ambient air quality standards are
hardly static; even if the governing statutory term is taken to be clear
and firm, the agency’s practice has been otherwise.230 The NLRB operates, in practice, as a common law court, adapting statutory terms
to new facts and values.231 The principal judgments about what qualifies as a “drug” have come from the FDA, not from courts, which
have played a supplemental role. The FDA’s assertion of jurisdiction
over tobacco is merely an unusually visible and dramatic instance of
this phenomenon.
Is this shift undesirable or illegitimate? It might be argued that
the process of common law judgment by administrative agencies is
unacceptable because agencies are subject to the influence of powerful private interests, or factions, while independent courts are far less
vulnerable to such influence. On one view, both the vulnerability of
agencies to factions and the interest of agencies in increasing their
own power and authority argue against the common law analogy; at
least common law judges had, and have, the virtues of comparative
independence. The susceptibility of agencies to “faction” is a persistent theme in administrative law,232 and those who emphasize that
theme would be likely to favor the more contextual interpretation offered in Part I, to seek express legislative authorization for the new
FDA interpretation, and to be unconvinced by the pro-deference argument I am urging here.
The basic claim on behalf of the transformation I am describing
is rooted directly in Chevron; it emphasizes both democratic and
technocratic values. When compared with common law courts, agencies have a greater understanding of relevant facts, and they also
have a degree of political responsiveness, which is a virtue as well as a

229. See Glen O. Robinson, The Electronic First Amendment: An Essay for the New Age, 47
DUKE L.J. 899, 926-930 (1998).
230. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
857-58 (1984).
231. See ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 13 (1976).
232. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 1667, 1684-85 (1975); JAMES O. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY 158 (1978).
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potential vice. The common law role of agencies is a function of
specifications of statutory terms that result either from new factual
knowledge or from changes in values, or from some combination of
the two. The reversal in Chevron itself—from a smokestack definition of “source” to a plant-wide definition of “source”—was partly a
product of technocratic values suggesting that this strategy would
work best;233 it was also undoubtedly a product of political values and
interests calling for less costly means of achieving environmental protection. To the suggestion that this position means that some statutes
(more accurately, their terms in some applications) might be lost or
misdirected as a result of new agency rulings, a response might be
given in Justice Scalia’s words: “[L]ots of once-heralded programs
ought to get lost or misdirected, in vast hallways or elsewhere. Yesterday’s herald is today’s bore—although we judges, in the seclusion
of our chambers, may not be au courant enough to realize it.”234
The FDCA was of course written many years ago, and it defies
belief to suggest that there is, in the background of that Act, any
clear or simple legislative intent235 about whether tobacco might be
counted as a drug in light of modern understandings of the effects of
tobacco and of the understandings and desires of cigarette companies
about those effects. The FDA is in an unusually good position to obtain information about those effects, understandings, and desires. Its
assertion of regulatory power has already received and will inevitably
continue to receive an enormously high degree of political attention,
from Congress as well as from the President, not to mention the relevant groups that appear before the FDA itself. The ordinary understanding of the statutory text supports the FDA’s position, and
nothing in subsequent developments in Congress has divested the
FDA of the authority that it would otherwise have. In applying the
FDCA to tobacco, the FDA performed a lawful common law function, one that also has a high degree of democratic legitimacy. Where
Congress has not spoken clearly, the role of the reviewing court is to

233. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 857-58 (discussing the rationale underlying the new definition
of “source”).
234. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing As An Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 897 (1983).
235. There are of course both practical and theoretical questions involved in the use of the
word “intent.” Some people doubt that legislatures, as collective bodies, have intentions. See
Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 881 (1930). Others doubt the relevance of intention even if there is such a thing. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (1899).
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obtain assurance of the reasonableness of the agency’s decision in
terms of facts, policy, and law, and there can be no doubt that the
FDA’s judgment was reasonable here.
C. Counters to Chevron
There are several possible responses to the argument rooted in
Chevron.
1. Jurisdiction. It might be argued that the FDA has, by its own
lights, made a jurisdictional determination, and perhaps an agency
does not have, under Chevron, the power to determine its own jurisdiction. As a matter of first principles, it is unclear whether Chevron
deference should be due to an agency involved in a jurisdictional determination.
This continues to be a disputed question.236 On the one hand, it
might be thought that courts should not presume that Congress intended to give agencies the power to decide the extent of their own
jurisdiction.237 The likelihood of bias and self-dealing might well be
taken to argue against deference to jurisdictional judgments. On the
other hand, two points argue in favor of granting deference to agency
interpretations even when jurisdiction is at issue.238 First, a prime argument for Chevron is its relative simplicity, and if courts were to attempt to distinguish between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional determinations, that advantage might well be lost. This is a thin and
shifting line; most assertions of agency power can be deemed

236. See Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 210, at 2097-2100.
237. See Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 383-388 (1988)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Federal Power Act did not confer such power on the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission); Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 413-14
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (refusing to permit the SEC to “advance into an area not contemplated by
Congress”); cf. National Wildlife Found. v. ICC, 850 F2d 694, 699 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting
that Chevron may require deference to jurisdictional determinations, but stating that it need
not decide the point because the agency is disclaiming authority (citing Schwabacker v. United
States, 334 U.S. 182, 204 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)); New York Shipping Ass’n v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 854 F.2d 1338, 1363-65 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (giving “no special deference
to an agency’s interpretation of labor laws when those laws were not committed to that agency
for enforcement”); see also Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron’s Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 260-61 (1988) (criticizing judicial
acceptance of all agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous language as too simple and
indiscriminate).
238. See Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 53-54 (1990) (White, J., dissenting)
(listing numerous cases which grant this deference); Mississippi Power & Light, 487 U.S. 354,
377-83 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating it is “both necessary and appropriate” to defer to agencies’ interpretation of their statutory jurisdiction).
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“jurisdictional.” Second, Chevron is in part a recognition of the comparative advantages of agencies over courts, stemming from the
agencies’ greater factfinding power and electoral legitimacy, and
those comparative advantages seem to apply to jurisdictional determinations as well. An extension of jurisdiction is likely to reflect political judgments, assessments of underlying facts, or both; the assertion of jurisdiction over tobacco products is certainly a case in point.
In any event, the cases appear to have settled, at least implicitly, on
the view that jurisdictional determinations are not entitled to less
deference.
It is also possible to question whether the determination in the
FDA case is truly “jurisdictional” in the sense relevant to the dispute
over Chevron’s scope. To be sure, the FDA has labeled its determination “jurisdictional.” At the same time, is every FDA decision to consider some article a drug “jurisdictional” in the sense that it calls into
question the applicability of Chevron? Perhaps this determination is
more in the nature of an application of a statutory term to a disputed
case than a judgment that the FDA has authority over a whole class
of cases that may or may not fit within a statutory term. When the
FDA asserts authority over any particular article of commerce, its assertion might be described as “jurisdictional”; but if FDA assertions
of this kind are jurisdictional, then deference will not be due to the
FDA in a wide range of cases that call for distinctly administrative
competence.
2. Change in Agency’s Position. Before Chevron, agency interpretations were entitled to little or no deference if they were inconsistent or if the agency’s current interpretation departed from longstanding agency understandings.239 After Chevron, however, the cases
are ambiguous, some suggesting that inconsistency does not eliminate
deference and others suggesting that the case for deference is significantly reduced if the agency has changed its mind.240 Here, it might be
urged that the fact that the FDA has departed from a longstanding
interpretation is sufficient to reduce the level of deference under
Chevron.

239. See Gossett, supra note 180, at 681.
240. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (upholding changed agency interpretation); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 445 (1987) (rejecting a new agency interpretation that was not in
line with congressional intent); Gossett, supra note 180, at 698 (examining cases in which the
agency interpretation was rejected for reasons other than the interpretation’s revision).
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It probably makes sense to say that a steady course of administrative interpretation is entitled to an unusually high level of deference. If the agency’s course has been steady, then reliance interests
may have built up around it; there may be special reason to think the
old interpretation makes sense; and Congress and relevant interests
have not, by hypothesis, showed dissatisfaction with it, even though
they have had some time in which to do so. It does not, however,
make sense to say that a new interpretation is entitled to no deference at all. Chevron itself was a case in which the agency changed its
mind, partly because of political judgments, partly because of technical ones; consider, as well, Rust v. Sullivan, upholding the so-called
“abortion gag rule,” a new administrative interpretation driven
largely by political judgments. The case for deference is of course
heightened when the area involves a high degree of political visibility
or technical complexity, and the FDA rule involves both. I conclude
that the fact that the FDA changed its mind is relevant and justifies
less deference than an unbroken pattern of interpretation, but it provides insufficient reason to disallow the FDA from adopting a reasonable understanding of the statutory terms.
3. Other canons? Chevron is not of course the only canon of construction. There are many others, and sometimes they trump Chevron. For example, the idea that statutes will be construed to avoid serious constitutional doubts seems to defeat agency interpretations,241
in part on the theory that Congress, rather than agencies, should deliberate explicitly on questions that are close to the constitutional
line. This notion operates as a more targeted and narrower version of
the nondelegation doctrine, requiring legislative focus on certain issues. The notion that statutes will not ordinarily be taken to apply
outside the territorial boundaries of the United States—a notion that
is also intended to ensure legislative focus on the relevant question—
also seems to prevail over agency interpretations.242
If there were an applicable canon of construction that would
trump the FDA’s interpretation, then the FDA should not prevail. It
is difficult, however, to find any such canon in this case. To be sure,
the FDA’s assertion of authority over tobacco places some federal
241. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568, 574-75 (1988).
242. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); see also California State
Bd. of Optometry v. FTC, 910 F.2d 976, 981-82 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that a federal agency
may not displace state power through its rulemaking authority unless specifically granted the
power to do so by Congress).
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authority in an area that has also been regulated by the states. It
would be implausible, however, to say that the FDA’s decision triggers a relevant canon of construction, as in the idea that ambiguous
statutes should not lightly be taken to preempt state law. No countervailing canon of construction defeats the application of Chevron.
Compare, in this regard, the question of whether the FDA has
the authority to restrict the promotion and advertising of tobacco
products through a ban on the sale to people under the age of eighteen, detailed verification requirements, bans on sales through vending machines, requirements of black-and-white text-only advertising,
and prohibitions of use of brand names to sponsor entries, teams,
sporting, and other events.243 The relevant statute allows the FDA to
“require that a device be restricted to sale, distribution or use . . .
upon such . . . conditions as the” FDA may prescribe by regulation. 244
The FDA argued that restrictions on promotion and advertising are
restrictions on the conditions of sale, designed to ensure the safety of
tobacco products by preventing children and adolescents from using
them and becoming addicted to them.245 The district court rejected
this argument on the ground that “sale” does not include
“advertising” and with the suggestion that “conditions” could not be
construed to allow restrictions on advertising and promotion.246
The analysis here suggests that that court was probably wrong
under Chevron: the statute has considerable ambiguity here, and the
term “conditions” on “sale, distribution, or use” can reasonably be
understood to include restrictions on advertising and promotion. The
court’s decision would, however, be strengthened if it were thought
that some or all of these restrictions raised serious questions under
the First Amendment. A claim to this effect raises many issues by itself, and I do not believe that the First Amendment obstacles are in
fact serious.247 This is, however, a controversial view of the First

243. See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374, 1397 nn.20-21 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
244. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e) (1994).
245. See Coyne Beahm, 966 F. Supp. at 1398.
246. See id. at 1398-99.
247. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 344 (1986) (holding
that a Puerto Rican law prohibiting local advertisements inviting residents of Puerto Rico to
visit casinos did not violate the First Amendment). Thus the case is, on this dimension, akin to
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), where the Court found the constitutional issue insufficiently serious to justify a rejection of the agency’s interpretation. See id. at 203.
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Amendment,248 and the best argument against the FDA’s position on
this count would invoke the constitutional background.
D. Summary
There have been many strands in the foregoing argument, and
by way of summary, it may be useful to outline the most plausible
opinions and surrounding rationales against and for the FDA (in ascending order of persuasiveness).
The FDA’s regulation might be invalidated on the following
grounds:
1. It might be held that in the view of the enacting Congress, tobacco did not count as a “drug” and that this original understanding
is decisive. This is the weakest argument against the FDA because
the general terms are what matter, and because the original understanding about the applications of those terms were not enacted into
law.
2. It might be held that the FDA’s longstanding interpretation,
and Congress’s failure to enact legislation against the background of
that interpretation, foreclose a definition of “drug” that includes tobacco. This argument is not entirely without force, but in the end, it is
unconvincing, because agencies are allowed to change their mind,
and Congress does not legislate by failing to legislate.
3. It might be held that the FDA’s longstanding interpretation
and Congress’s actual enactment of tobacco regulation work to prevent the FDA from regulating tobacco. This argument is convincing
insofar as there is a direct conflict between the FDA regulation and
congressional enactments. It also has some force as applied to the
regulation as a whole. In the end, however, it is also unconvincing,
because it is too close to an argument for an implied repeal and because agencies should be entitled to change their minds about the
meaning of an ambiguous statute in the face of response to new understandings of underlying facts (and new values as well).
4. It might be held that the contextual understanding of the definition of “drug” suggests that to qualify as such, articles must be sold
with some kind of representation of actual beneficial effects on the
human body and that tobacco is not, realistically speaking, being sold
with any such representation. If a court were interpreting the statute

248. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 509-12 (1996) (criticizing the
reasoning in Posadas).
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in the first instance, this argument would have considerable weight,
especially when combined with argument (3) above. In light, however, of the FDA’s factual findings and the appropriate judicial posture in reviewing an agency interpretation of general statutory terms
after Chevron, that argument is not persuasive.
On behalf of the FDA, the following arguments are available:
1. It might be held that the plain statutory terms suggest that tobacco must be treated as a drug, as Action for Smoking and Health
urged long ago. This argument is not entirely without force, but the
terms contain ambiguity, and the FDA should be authorized to decide otherwise, as it did until 1996.
2. It might be held that the statutory terms permit the FDA to
find both an actual effect on the function of the body, because of tobacco’s addictive properties, and an intention to affect the function of
the body, because of the knowledge of those properties on the part of
tobacco companies. This argument is unnecessarily broad, and the
contextual understanding of the term “drug” makes it at least unclear
whether the FDA could adopt this interpretation.
3. It might be held that the FDA has the authority to include tobacco within the category “drug” if and to the extent that the FDA
can point to tobacco companies’ knowledge of the tranquilizing and
stimulating properties of nicotine and advertising that suggests, explicitly or implicitly, that smoking has those properties. This would be
the best approach, because it is the narrowest basis for upholding
FDA authority.
CONCLUSION
As a matter of simple practice, administrative agencies have become America’s common law courts. The task of adapting the law to
new circumstances, of both value and of fact, is largely an administrative responsibility. Agencies specify general statutory terms and are
engaged in continuing processes of both “updating” and particularization.
In view of agency self-interest and the exercise of power by selfinterested private groups, this development is not without risks. On
balance, however, it is highly salutary. In an era that prizes both
democratic accountability and the technical knowledge that comes
from specialization, it is only natural that the process of updating the
law and adapting it to the particulars of individual cases will fall to
administrative agencies. Administrative agencies have, however, be-
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come our common law courts in a distinctive sense. On the one hand,
it is legitimate for them to undertake relatively rapid changes over
time, accountable as they are to the current administration—more legitimate than it is for common law courts to do the same thing.249 On
the other hand, the updating and particularizing functions of administrative agencies must be disciplined by statutory boundaries, by
“clear statement” principles, and by requirements of reasoned decisionmaking, requirements with both substantive and procedural
components.
These points very much bear on the multiple government efforts
to regulate tobacco. The regulation of tobacco is best treated as a political rather than a judicial task (however active common law courts
have become in the context of tort actions). Statutory language is
best understood contextually, and, as a general rule, ambiguous terms
should not be taken to cover cases far beyond the contemplation of
the enacting legislature. As a matter of administrative law, however,
the assertion of jurisdiction by the FDA is a largely ordinary adaptation of general statutory text to a particular article, understood as a
“drug” both because of new understandings of facts and because of a
wide range of democratic pressures and influences. The FDA is
authorized to adapt the statutory terms in this way in light of the
general character of those terms and in light of its findings with respect to the tranquilizing and stimulating effects of nicotine. This argument, largely institutional in character, is the narrowest and, in the
end, the most convincing one on the FDA’s behalf.
On an independent reading of the FDCA, there is an argument
that tobacco is not a “drug” within the meaning of the Act, understood in its historical context. But the best reading of the FDCA, understood in the context of the modern regulatory state, is that the
FDA has the authority to conclude otherwise, and to treat tobacco as
a drug if it chooses to do so.

249. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844-45
(1984); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

